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I.

INTRODUCTION

Globalization has indeed made the world “flat,” and the sports
industry is no exception. Throughout the last two decades, American
professional sports leagues have attempted with varying degrees of success
to expand worldwide and create global product markets. The impact of this
internationalization is apparent—from the success of the World Baseball
Classic in 2006 and 2009 to the exploding popularity that has led the
National Basketball Association (“NBA”) to announce the creation of NBA
China, a Chinese subsidiary league pairing Disney with other local
partners.1 Perhaps the most significant of these effects is that the current
player pool for most of the top American professional sports leagues is no
longer purely domestic. This sea change is well underway, with
international players comprising significant portions of current professional
sports rosters across the sporting spectrum.2 Partly as a result of domestic
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1. Michael J. de la Merced, Disney Among Firms to Buy Stake in NBA’s China
Subsidiary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2008, at C9.
2. There were seventy-seven international players from thirty-two countries and
territories on NBA rosters as of January 2009. NBA.com, NBA Players from Around the
World: 2008-09 Season, http://www.nba.com/players/int_players_0809.html (last visited
Sept. 20, 2009). On Opening Day 2008, 239 Major League Baseball players (or twentyeight percent of all players) were international. Larry Fine, International Players Comprise
28 pct of MLB Rosters, REUTERS, Apr. 1, 2008,
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market saturation, and partly as a result of the sports leagues attempting to
expand to global markets, individual clubs are forced to look—and think—
globally when seeking top-notch talent. The importation of playing talent
into these leagues facilitates their global marketability, as fan affinity in a
foreign market is likely to be greater when there is a player from that
market in the league. The hope is that the establishment of global labor
markets will help the leagues create global product markets.
Major League Baseball (“MLB”) has a unique approach to this global
labor exchange. This approach is evidenced by the system that was created
to transfer players from the Japanese professional baseball league, Nippon
Professional Baseball (“NPB”), to MLB teams following the departures of
several high profile players in the mid-1990’s. Over the last thirteen years,
a system has evolved whereby the transfer of players from NPB to MLB is
governed by a process that allows owners of NPB teams to receive
compensation for their players who are still under contract but desire to
leave for MLB before they are eligible for free agency in NPB. When a
player is under contract with a team in NPB and wishes to sign a contract
with an MLB team, he must go through the “posting process.” This
process gives every MLB team the opportunity to bid to obtain the rights to
negotiate a contract with him. High-profile players such as Ichiro Suzuki
and Daisuke Matsuzaka have joined MLB through this process, and as
such, there has been considerable public attention directed towards it.3
While significant media attention was focused on the staggering amount
the Boston Red Sox paid for the right to negotiate with Matsuzaka—
$51,111,111.114—there has been scant attention paid to the suboptimal

http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSSP8408520080402. This was down
slightly from the all-time high of 246 set in 2007. Jack Curry, Majors Set Record for
International Players, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/04/sports/baseball/04curry.html. During the 2007-08
season, there were 273 non-North American players from fourteen different nations in the
NHL. This comprised over thirty-three percent of the players in the league. NHL
International, NHL.com, http://www.nhl.com/ice/page.htm?id=26372 (last visited Sept. 20,
2009) [hereinafter NHL International].
3. See Duane Rockerbie, Peculiarities of the Major League Baseball Posting System
(July 2007) (on file with author) (discussing the increased attention paid to the posting
system in recent years). The agreement creating the posting process was in part borne out of
the way in which Hideo Nomo, then a star pitcher with the Kintetsu Buffaloes, arrived in
MLB. Although still under contract with his NPB team, Nomo had a strong desire to pitch
in MLB and sought to get out of his NPB contract. Rather than wait the nine years required
to become a free agent, Nomo “retired” from NPB and signed a contract with the Los
Angeles Dodgers of MLB. Id. Bothered by this strategy, NPB and MLB agreed to the
current posting system in hopes of deterring future Japanese stars from pursuing a similar
path. Id.
4. Posting System, BR Bullpen, Baseball-Reference.com, http://www.baseballreference.com/bpv/index.php?title=Posting_system (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).
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nature of the posting process for at least two of the three stakeholders.5
The issue of player transfers is pressing in the National Hockey
League (“NHL”) as well, which means that two of the three North
American-based professional sports leagues that draw significantly from a
global player pool are having issues regarding their player transfer
systems.6 There are several alternatives to the current process that can
address the suboptimality of the status quo and provide for more efficient
player transfers between leagues. A more efficient posting process is
important for historical reasons as well, with the Negro Leagues serving as
an example of how an inadequate player transfer system can help lead to
the demise of a league.
II.

THE POSTING PROCESS

A.

History

A brief examination of the history of the posting process, and the
events that led to its development, is essential for understanding why the
process exists in its current form. The movement of three players—Hideo
Nomo, Hideki Irabu, and Alfonso Soriano—from NPB to MLB in the mid1990s persuaded the two leagues to complete a formal arrangement for the
transfer of players. However, the leagues’ shared history extends long
before then. The first Japanese player to appear in MLB was Masanori
Murakami.7 His debut was the product of an exchange program between
the Nankai Hawks and the San Francisco Giants, whereby Nankai sent
three players to play in the Giants’ minor league system in 1964.8
Murakami performed so well in the minor leagues that the Giants promoted
him to the major leagues later that season, where his continued strong
performance led the Giants to seek his return for the 1965 season.9 While
Nankai originally balked at the prospect, the team ultimately capitulated on
the condition that Murakami be permanently returned after the season.10

5. See discussion infra Part III (describing the suboptimalities of the current posting
system).
6. The National Football League, on the other hand, has struggled to establish an
international pipeline for player talent.
7. Evan Osborne, Baseball’s International Division of Labor, 7 J. OF SPORTS ECON.
150 (2006).
8. Michael Street, A Brief History of Japanese-American Baseball Relations, Part 1:
The Groundbreaker, Dec. 2, 2008, http://www.examiner.com/x-739-AsianAmerican-SportsExaminer~y2008m12d2-A-brief-history-of-JapaneseAmerican-baseball-relations-Part-1The-Groundbreaker.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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Despite a successful 1965 season, he was returned to the Japanese team.11
This led to a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” between MLB and NPB in 1967,
whereby MLB teams agreed that they would not sign NPB players unless
they were free agents.12 Though a number of American players pursued
careers in NPB (typically after their MLB careers were over), no Japanese
player since Murakami moved to MLB until Hideo Nomo left the Kintetsu
Buffaloes for the Los Angeles Dodgers in 1995.13
Nomo, a bona-fide star in Japan, used a loophole in his NPB contract
in order to “retire” from his NPB team at the age of 26 so that he could
avoid that league’s free agency restrictions.14 Nomo’s retirement allowed
him to sign a three-year, $4.3 million contract with the Los Angeles
Dodgers, a lucrative move that had a profound impact on both MLB and
NPB franchise owners.
More significant than the Nomo retirement, at least in terms of
providing the impetus for an agreement for the transfer of players from
NPB to MLB, was the movement of star pitcher Hideki Irabu from the
Chiba Lotte Marines to the New York Yankees in 1997.15 Prior to the
existence of the formal posting process, the relationships between NPB
teams and MLB teams were formed on an ad hoc basis, with the parties
sometimes developing “working agreements” between individual clubs.16
At the time, Irabu’s Japanese team, the Marines, had developed a working
agreement with the San Diego Padres of MLB. The working agreement
allowed the Padres to buy the exclusive right to negotiate a contract with
Irabu, which the Padres did.17 However, Irabu was unaware of his sale
until it was completed without his permission. He then declared his
intention to play only for the New York Yankees, maintaining this stance
until a trade was worked out between the Padres and Yankees before the
1997 season.18 Again, the transfer of the Japanese player, and the way in
which it transpired, raised sufficient concern on both sides of the Pacific to
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Michael Street, A Brief History of Japanese-American Baseball Relations, Part 2:
The Tornado, Dec. 3, 2008, http://www.examiner.com/x-739-AsianAmerican-SportsExaminer~y2008m12d3-A-brief-history-of-JapaneseAmerican-baseball-relations-Part-2The-Tornado.
14. Casey Duncan, Stealing Signs: Is Professional Baseball’s United States-Japanese
Player Contract Agreement Enough to Avoid Another “Baseball War”?, 13 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 87, 98 (2003).
15. See William B. Gould IV, Globalization in Collective Bargaining, Baseball, and
Matsuzaka: Labor and Antitrust Law on the Diamond, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 283,
289 (2007) (discussing the developments that led to the formation of the current posting
system).
16. Duncan, supra note 14, at 98.
17. Gould, supra note 15, at 289.
18. Street, supra note 13.
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move the two leagues closer to a formal arrangement.
Alfonso Soriano was the final player transferred prior to the adoption
of the posting system. In 1998, following the inability of Soriano to reach
agreement on a contract with his NPB club, Hiroshima Toyo Carp, he
attempted to retire, much in the same way Nomo had done three years
earlier.19 But NPB had closed the loophole that Nomo previously
exploited, and believed that it had exclusive rights to Soriano.20 Over the
protests, threats and objections of NPB, Soriano signed a contract with the
New York Yankees after a declaration by the MLB Commissioner’s Office
that Soriano was, in fact, a free agent capable of signing with any team he
desired.21 For NPB, this was a clear-cut sign that a formal agreement
between NPB and MLB was the only way to stem the tide of player
defections to MLB.
B.

Description of the Posting System

There are three primary actors in the posting process who have a
direct stake in the resulting outcome—the NPB team that transfers the
player, the MLB team to which the player is transferred, and the player
himself. (There is potentially a fourth actor, the player’s agent, but because
the agent’s interests are aligned with the player’s in the posting scenario,
we consider just the player here.)22 Japanese players do not become
international free agents until after they have played nine years in NPB;23
19. Duncan, supra note 14, at 89, 100.
20. Id. at 100. Soriano only played the 1997 season for Hiroshima.
21. Id.
22. The agent should want to do away with the posting fee because it results in the
player’s salary decreasing, which in turn decreases the agent’s fee (as baseball agents
typically work on a percentage basis).
23. There are two categories of free agency in Japanese baseball – international and
domestic. Prior to 2008, players could achieve domestic free agency after eight years, and
were allowed to move only to other NPB teams; international free agency could be attained
after nine years, at which point players could sign with MLB teams with no compensation
owed to their former NPB team. See 2009 NPB Free Agents, NPB Tracker,
http://www.npbtracker.com/2009-npb-free-agents/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2009) (describing
the NPB free agency system). There was fairly little player movement under the previous
domestic free agency system from the time that it was introduced in 1993 through 2008.
Only thirty-two of the 251 players who became free agents from 2000 to 2003 switched
teams. Andrew Zimbalist, An Exchange of Strategies Could Benefit MLB, Japanese
Leagues Alike, SPORTS BUS. J., July 16, 2007, at 29, available at
http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/55693. This was likely due to a compensation
structure in which a team signing a free agent was required to pay the player’s former team
1.2 times the player’s previous salary (or eighty percent of his previous year’s salary and a
player from the new team’s roster). This led to few transfers that did not involve high
quality, modestly priced players. Id. While the international free agency rules remain
unchanged, there was a major change in the domestic free agency rules in 2008. First, the
service time required for a player to become a free agent was decreased. Players who
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after their ninth year, they are free to sign a contract with any club,
including those in MLB, without any transfer fee paid to the former NPB
club. Conversely, any Japanese player who has not yet played for nine
years in NPB may not sign with an MLB team, having not yet attained
international free agent status under NPB rules.24
However, a player with less than nine years of experience who wishes
to sign with an MLB team may ask his Japanese team to “post” him. If the
NPB team agrees to post the player, it notifies the office of the NPB
Commissioner, which then notifies the MLB Commissioner, at which point
all 30 MLB teams are notified that the player is available.25
Once individual MLB teams have been notified, a four-day period
begins during which MLB teams may compete in a sealed-bid auction for
the exclusive right to negotiate a contract with the posted player.26 At the
end of the four-day period, all bids are collected by the MLB
Commissioner’s office and opened. The NPB team is then notified of the
amount of the highest bid (but not the identity of the MLB team) and has a
four-day period to decide whether or not the winning bid will be accepted.27
As of yet, in each situation where a winning bid has been submitted, it has
been accepted by the NPB team. The amount of the bid is considered the
“transfer fee” associated with the movement of the player. Following the
acceptance of the highest bid by the NPB club, the MLB team that won the
auction then has thirty days to negotiate a contract with the player. Should
entered NPB during or after the 2007 draft could become free agents after seven years.
2009 NPB Free Agents, supra. More importantly, the amount of compensation owed by the
teams signing free agent players was decreased greatly. Under the new rule, players are
classified into three groups according to their salaries on their prior teams. Interview with
Anonymous MLB Executive (July 17, 2008) (notes on file with Professor Rosner).
Compensation owed by a team signing one of another team's three highest paid players
(called ‘A players’) is eighty percent of the player’s previous year’s salary (or fifty percent
and a player), while the compensation owed by the signing team for players whose salaries
rank from the fourth highest to the tenth highest on their former team (‘B players’) is 60
percent of their previous year’s salary (or forty percent and a player), and players whose
salary ranks eleventh or below on their former team (‘C players’) can be signed without any
compensation. Id. If the option of taking a lesser amount of monetary compensation and a
player is chosen by the free agent’s former team, the player selected as compensation is
chosen by the free agent’s former team from among the players on his new team. Id. This
excludes non-Japanese players and twenty-eighty players that the signing team chooses to
protect. Id. This could subject the signing team to losing a young prospect and could
represent a significant cost. Any compensation owed by a team signing a free agent
disincentivizes a team from doing so to some degree. A club desiring a particular free agent
must then decide whether that player is worth the cost.
24. Paul White, Japan Frets Over Talent Exodus to North America, USA TODAY, Mar.
28, 2007, at 1C.
25. Rockerbie, supra note 3.
26. Allan T. Ingraham, A Fair Posting Process for Japanese Professionals Entering
Major League Baseball, 24 ENT. AND SPORTS LAW. 1, 1 (2007).
27. Rockerbie, supra note 3.
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the contract negotiation yield a signed deal, the transfer fee is then paid to
the NPB team by the MLB team, and the player becomes a member of the
MLB team.28 If the player and the MLB team do not come to an
agreement, however, the NPB team does not receive the transfer fee and
the player returns to the NPB team under the terms of his original contract
with the club.29 The posting system is unilateral in nature, as it does not
apply to MLB players seeking employment in Japan.30
The following chart31 is a complete representation of every player who
has been successfully posted, along with the MLB team that “won” the
auction and the price that team paid for the rights to negotiate with the
player:
DATE
PLAYER
MLB TEAM
TRANSFER FEE
($US)
2/1999

Alejandro
Quezada
11/2000 Ichiro
Suzuki
1/2003
Kazuhisa
Ishii
2/2003
Ramon
Ramirez
11/2003 Akinori
Otsuka
1/2005
Norihiro
Nakamura
12/2005 Shinji Mori
11/2006 Daisuke
Matsuzaka
11/2006 Akinori
Iwamura
11/2006 Kei Igawa

Cincinnati
Reds
Seattle
Mariners
Los Angeles
Dodgers
San Diego
Padres
San Diego
Padres
Los Angeles
Dodgers
Tampa Bay
Devil Rays
Boston Red
Sox
Tampa Bay
Devil Rays
New York
Yankees

$400,001
$13,125,000
$11,260,000
$300,050
$300,000
Unknown32
$1,000,000
$51,111,111.11
$4,500,000
$26,000,194

28. Ingraham, supra note 26, at 15.
29. United States – Japanese Player Contract Agreement,
http://jpbpa.net/convention/2001_e.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
30. Rockerbie, supra note 3.
31. This chart is reproduced from Rockerbie, supra note 3.
32. While the actual amount of the posting fee is unknown, it is believed to have been
for a nominal amount. Tony Jackson, Costly Risk Nakamura Leaves Money, Stardom to Join
Dodgers, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 22, 2005.
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The example of Matsuzaka, a star pitcher for the Seibu Lions, is
illustrative of the posting process. He had established himself as a premier
Japanese professional baseball pitcher.33 The Boston Red Sox outbid both
the New York Mets (who bid a reported $39 million) and the New York
Yankees (who bid $33 million), determining that the right to negotiate with
Matsuzaka was worth an unprecedented $51.1 million.34 Following the
announcement of its winning bid, the Red Sox then had thirty days to
negotiate a contract with Matsuzaka, with the Seibu Lions receiving the
$51.1M upon the signing of the contract. Ultimately, the Red Sox and
Matsuzaka agreed to a six-year, $52 million contract, putting the total
expenditures by the Red Sox at $103.1 million for one player.35
III. THE SUBOPTIMALITIES OF THE POSTING PROCESS
There are several reasons why the posting process is suboptimal,
including: 1) it creates windfall profits for the NPB transfer team; 2) the
first-price-sealed-bid auction inflates winning bids by MLB teams; 3)
individual players are unable to realize their full market value in contract
negotiations; 4) individual players have no ability to choose the MLB
teams for which they play; 5) the system could adversely affect the
competitive balance of MLB teams; and 6) the loss of marquee players
negatively impacts NPB as a league. This section is divided into five subsections that each address the posting process and its impact on the actors
involved. These sections also explore whether recent developments will
alter the relationship between MLB and NPB.
A.

Windfall Profits for the NPB Clubs

The Seibu Lions, as the transferee team and recipient of the $51.1
million posting fee, is the beneficiary of a system that creates optimal
outputs from its perspective. Although the loss of star players certainly
impacts the team’s prospects for competitive success and its long-term
profitability, the transfer fee received by NPB teams is money that the team
would otherwise not have received if the player had left as a free agent or
had signed with MLB before being drafted by or playing in an NPB
organization. Thus, the transfer fee represents a windfall profit for the

33. Barry M. Bloom, Red Sox win Matsuzaka bid, MLB.COM, Nov. 15, 2006,
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20061113&content_id=1739983&vkey=hotstove
2006&fext=.jsp.
34. Id.
35. Gordon Edes, Matsuzaka, Red Sox Agree to Terms, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 14, 2006,
http://www.boston.com/sports/baseball/redsox/articles/2006/12/14/matsuzaka_red_sox_agre
e_to_terms/.
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NPB team. In exchange for two years without Matsuzaka (who would have
been a free agent after the 2008 season), the Lions received approximately
three times the entire team’s 2006 payroll, just for owning the rights to the
star pitcher.36 From a financial perspective, the posting system is tilted
heavily in favor of the current Japanese team, as Seibu received an amount
for the rights to the player that was far in excess of the value of the player’s
marginal revenue product that Seibu would have received had he played for
them in 2007 and 2008.37
Another factor contributing to the NPB windfall is that the bidding by
MLB teams is conducted as a first-price-sealed-bid auction, where the
bidding parties do not know the amount that the others are bidding.38
Because of the zero-sum nature of this transfer (NPB’s financial gain is
MLB’s loss), a more efficient outcome could be achieved if the MLB teams
engaged in an ascending-price auction, where teams are apprised of the
value that the other teams attach to the individual player.39 In the
Matsuzaka bidding, the most efficient bid by the Red Sox would have been
just $1 more than the New York Mets (the next highest bidder), a bid that
would have been in the $39 million range.40 Because the bidding was
sealed, however, the Red Sox outbid the Mets by more than $12 million, an
inefficiency directly captured by the Seibu Lions.
While the current posting process is favored by NPB teams that
capture the inefficiencies of the first-price-sealed-bid auction, the system is
suboptimal for the MLB team paying the transfer fee. Each individual
MLB team that bids must make a determination, based upon little market
evidence, regarding the optimal price to be paid for the rights to negotiate
with the player. While the MLB team wants to win the auction, it wants to
bid just $1 more than the next highest bidder. But in the absence of any
reliable information about the presence, identity, and number of other
actors in the market, it is extremely difficult to make this precise
determination. The result, then, is the possibility that MLB teams who are
committed to winning the auction (e.g., the Red Sox) will pay far more for
a player than they otherwise would have if the auction were not private.
B.

The Player’s Loss of Market Value and Freedom of Choice

The third actor in the process, the individual player, also succumbs to
suboptimal outputs because he is unable to capture his full market value
36. Jeff Sackman, Putting a Price on Matsuzaka, THE HARDBALL TIMES, Nov. 1, 2006,
http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/putting-a-price-on-matsuzaka/.
37. Ingraham, supra note 26, at 17.
38. Id. at 1.
39. Id. at 18.
40. Bloom, supra note 33.

ROSNERFINAL_FOUR

88

1/22/2010 5:12:21 PM

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 12:1

when signing a contract with the MLB team and cannot choose the MLB
club for which he will play. Players (and, consequentially, their agents) are
victimized by systemic limitations of the posting process that prevent the
player from signing a contract that is truly indicative of his full market
value. When computing a value and a price ceiling for an individual
player, MLB teams usually consider all of the outlays associated with
signing that player to a contract. In the case of acquiring a player from
NPB, the MLB team computes the value of the player (the price the team is
willing to pay), by adding the transfer fee to the value of the contract.41 In
Matsuzaka’s case, the Red Sox attributed a value to the player of $103.1
million—$51.1 million in the transfer fee and another $52 million for the
contract itself. Thus, the value attached to Matsuzaka by the Red Sox was
nearly double what Matsuzaka actually received in compensation. It is
highly likely that the player would have received a higher salary from the
club but for the posting fee that was paid to acquire his rights. One
commentator estimates that Seibu received 76.7 percent of Matsuzaka’s net
present value through posting him, whereas he received only 23.3 percent
of his own net present value.42 Thus, the NPB team is grossly
41. The club must also add to the equation any new or additional luxury tax payment
that may have to be paid on the value of the contract that the player signs with the club,
though not on the amount of the posting fee paid to acquire the rights to the player. Maury
Brown, Breaking Down MLB’s Luxury Tax: 2003-2007, BIZOFBASEBALL.COM, Dec. 25,
2007,
http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1805&Itemi
d=41. Including the salary paid to Matsuzaka in 2007, the Red Sox had a team payroll of
$155,402,595, and thus had to make a luxury tax payment to Major League Baseball of
$6,064,287. Id. The Red Sox paid a tax rate of 40% on this amount, which represents the
club’s payroll for its forty-man roster, including player salaries and prorated shares of all
signing and incentive bonuses, option buyouts, non-cash compensation, and cash
transactions. Id. Thus, in addition to Matsuzaka’s salary, the Red Sox paid an additional
luxury tax of approximately $2,533,333 due to his 2007 salary of $6 million and the
$333,333.33 signing bonus allocation (representing a prorated share of his $2 million
signing bonus over the six-year life of the contract). Cot’s Baseball Contracts, Boston Red
Sox, http://mlbcontracts.blogspot.com/2004/12/boston-red-sox.html (last visited Oct. 2,
2009). When considering the actual signing bonus payment of $2 million, playing salary
and luxury tax, the club’s total expenditure on the player in 2007 was $10,533,333. Id. This
sum does not include the value of various perquisites afforded to Matsuzaka, including: the
services of a physical therapist, massage therapist, interpreter and a team employee to assist
with the Japanese media, eight first-class, round-trip airline tickets per year between Boston
and Japan, an annual spring training housing allowance of up to $25,000, an annual Boston
housing allowance of up to $75,000, a one-time moving allowance of up to $35,000, the use
of a Lincoln Town Car or similar car, and a Red Sox player ticket package, including two
field box seats. Id.
42. Ingraham, supra note 26, at 17. Matsuzaka’s contract with the Red Sox was worth
approximately $15.6 million to the player in current dollars, where Seibu received the full
amount of the $51.1 million transfer fee since it was paid up front. Id. If he had remained
with Seibu, Matsuzaka would have been paid $4 million in both 2007 and 2008. Id. As a
nine-year veteran, he would have been eligible to come to MLB after the 2008 season as a
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overcompensated and the player dramatically undercompensated.
If Matsuzaka had been a traditional MLB free agent and the Red Sox
felt that he was valued at $103.1 million, then the Red Sox would have
been willing to sign him to a contract where he received that full $103.1
million. When initially discussing contract terms with the Red Sox after
the team won the auction, Matsuzaka and his agent, Scott Boras, felt that
the transfer fee should not be included in determining the value of
Matsuzaka to the Red Sox.43 Not surprisingly, the Red Sox included the
posting fee in all calculations of Matsuzaka’s value, based on the theory
that regardless of where the money was going, the team had to pay $103.1
million to get him in a Red Sox uniform. It has been predicted that, if a
simple bargaining model were used, Seibu would have received only 54.3
percent of Matsuzaka’s value and the player would have received the rest.44
In other words, had the transfer fee been the product of a negotiation
between Matsuzaka and Seibu, it is theorized that the maximum transfer
fee would have been $30.4 million, which is $20.7 million less than the
posting fee paid.45 Theoretically, then, the posting system also constitutes a
loss for all MLB players (and thus the MLBPA), as the amount of the
posting fee represents MLB club monies spent on player compensation that
does not actually accrue to the players.
While the player does have the ability to walk away from negotiations
and not sign a contract with the MLB team, this threat has yet to
materialize in any of the ten instances where a player has been posted to a
MLB team.46 For the players, then, there is very little they can do to
leverage a fair market deal out of the MLB team. A player must settle for a
contract that is not indicative of his actual market value if he chooses to
play in MLB; otherwise, he can refuse to sign the contract and return to
Japan. In addition, it is unlikely that his Japanese club would want him to
return; the club previously decided that it would rather collect the posting
fee than retain the player’s services. The Seibu Lions received $51.1
million in exchange for Matsuzaka, instead of losing him without receiving
any compensation had he left the team via free agency upon expiration of
his contract after the 2008 season.47
free agent. Id. The net present value of his contract, had he stayed with Seibu in 2007 and
2008 and then come to MLB as an unrestricted free agent, would have been $15,518,029,
which is just less than the estimated net present value of Matsuzaka’s current $15,552,723
contract with the Red Sox. Id. Thus, Matsuzaka earned barely more as a result of coming
to MLB via the posting system than he would have by staying in Japan for two years and
then coming over as a traditional nine year free agent.
43. Edes, supra note 35.
44. Ingraham, supra note 26, at 18.
45. Id. at 17.
46. Posting System, supra note 4.
47. Sackman, supra note 36.
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An additional concern for the player is his inability to choose which
MLB club he will play for if he enters MLB via the posting process. The
player has no choice but to play for the team that wins the auction for his
services.48 Particularly with respect to the transfer of native Japanese
players, there is additional leverage held by the MLB team—the Japanese
player’s desire to save face by not turning down the American team. From
a cultural perspective, the loss of face that would be suffered by the player
who could not come to a negotiated agreement would be overwhelming,
and thus the prospect of this occurring is fairly low. Following the signing
of Matsuzaka for a below-market contract (not factoring in the posting fee),
many commentaries focused on the fact that Matsuzaka, because of the
cultural desire to preserve his image, would never have refused the Red
Sox offer and returned to Japan.49 That was not an option, especially for a
player as highly regarded in Japan as Matsuzaka.
The posting system also creates opportunities for moral hazard. There
exists the potential for under-the-table dealing between the NPB team and
the player in order to facilitate a contractual agreement between the player
and the MLB team. The NPB team could conceivably posit to the player,
“We’ll offer you $X million if you sign with the MLB team,” where X
represents the gap between the MLB club’s offer and the player’s desired
salary. The NPB team does not want the negotiation to fail because it
would then lose the posting fee. In addition, the posting system allows for
the possibility of foreclosure, or preemptive bidding because one team may
potentially bid far higher than the player’s value merely to obtain exclusive
negotiating rights with the player. The bidding team would not want to
sign the player to a contract, but does so as a defensive tactic to prevent a
rival from obtaining the player’s services for the upcoming season, since a
player can be posted only once in each offseason.50 Wide adoption of this
strategy could prevent the system from functioning effectively, as the only
players who will be successfully posted are those perceived to be of
marginal ability.51

48. This current system — that the NPB player can play only for the team that wins his
rights through the posting process — is largely a result of the aforementioned transfer of
Hideki Irabu from the Chiba Lotte Marines to the San Diego Padres, who subsequently
traded his rights to the New York Yankees following a demand by Irabu. Following the
Irabu transfer, NPB and MLB teams recognized the danger in permitting individual players
to demand to which team they are transferred, and agreed to establish the current posting
process. Street, supra note 8.
49. Jack Curry, After Forcing Issue, Red Sox On Verge of Matsuzaka Deal, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2006, at D1.
50. Rockerbie, supra note 3.
51. Id. at 9.
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The Impact on MLB Competitive Balance

An equally large concern, particularly for MLB, is that the posting
process could adversely affect the competitive balance within the league.
If large-revenue MLB teams are the only teams with the financial means to
successfully bid on Japanese players, especially when the posting fees for
certain players reach into the $50 million territory, only certain teams will
have access to this market of players. Of the ten players who have been
successfully posted and transferred to MLB teams, only five have been
transferred to large-revenue teams.52 However, larger revenue clubs have
paid the four largest fees, suggesting that they have increased access to the
most desirable talent.53 While the empirical evidence seems to suggest that
this issue has not yet reached the level of being a problem requiring
immediate attention, the manner in which the Matsuzaka auction was won
raises concern for some.54 If only the largest revenue teams have access to
NPB stars in the posting process, then there is at least the possibility that an
unbalanced distribution of talent in MLB could result. This is particularly
concerning because the posting fee paid by the MLB team does not count
against the team’s luxury tax number, and thus, is not subject to a luxury
tax penalty.55 Had the Red Sox signed a free agent pitcher from another
team within MLB for the $103.1 million they paid for Matsuzaka, all
$103.1 million of that contract would have been subject to the 40% luxury
tax aimed at leveling the playing field in MLB. However, because $51.1
million of the money paid for Matsuzaka was allocated as a transfer fee
(and not subject to the luxury tax), the Red Sox luxury tax figure for the
Matsuzaka signing was only $52 million. This legal loophole circumvents
precisely the problem that the luxury tax was aimed at fixing, and furthers
the problem of competitive balance in MLB. Given that signing a player
from NPB has less of a luxury tax impact than signing a similar MLB free
agent, there is a credible risk that only large-market MLB teams will have
access to the posting process.56
D.

The Impact on Japanese Baseball

While the NPB team that successfully posts a player receives shortterm windfall profits by doing so, the loss of marquee players has a
52. Posting System, supra note 4.
53. Id.
54. See Sean McAdam, Boston Doesn’t Have Any Payroll Limitations, ESPN.COM,
Nov. 15, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/columns/story?id=2662770 (explaining teams
in smaller markets have a hard time competing for high priced talent).
55. Gould, supra note 15, at 293.
56. Jim Allen, Ishii Flies the Nest, JIM ALLEN’S JAPANESE BASEBALL PAGE, Jan. 10,
2002, http://www2.gol.com/ users/jallen/column/20020110.html.
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deleterious effect on the overall NPB league product and on the mediumand long-term business of the posting team itself. The migration of Hideo
Nomo to the Los Angeles Dodgers had a strong influence on both Japanese
baseball and MLB. Though Nomo was initially treated as a pariah when he
left NPB for America,57 fans grew to accept his departure and followed en
masse as the NHK public television network broadcast his games live
throughout Japan.58 His success with the Dodgers increased Japanese
interest in MLB and created opportunities for future Japanese players to
play in the United States.59 Since Nomo’s 1995 debut, 36 Japanese players
have played in MLB regular season games,60 including sixteen who were
on MLB Opening Day rosters in 2008.61
Legendary Japanese baseball player Sadaharu Oh stated: “It’s been a
great plus for baseball in Japan[.] Thanks to Nomo, kids in high school and
junior high now have dreams of playing in M.L.B. Going to America and
directly competing over there is a much better way to improve the level of
play here than the good-will-type all-star exhibition series they used to hold
when I was a player. Japan’s still inferior to America in baseball, but as
more players aim to play over there, the gap will continue to close.”62
With respect to how Nomo created opportunities for Japanese players
in the United States, Oh stated, “He showed that the level of Japanese
baseball was not that different from the major leagues[.]”63
Though Nomo’s successful MLB career positively impacted baseball
in both Japan and the United States, Japanese baseball has suffered from
the loss of a number of popular star players to MLB through both free
agency and posting. Despite three NPB teams generating over $80 million
by posting Matsuzaka, Igawa, and Iwamura prior to the 2007 season, there
was despair at the NPB offices over losing such popular players.64 There
seems to be some recognition that the pursuit of the short-term revenues
generated by posting could lead to a long-term decrease in revenues.
Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles manager Katsuya Nomura stated, “If this

57. Robert Whiting, Is the MLB Destroying Japan’s National Pastime?, JAPAN TIMES,
Apr. 14, 2007, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/sb20070411c1.html; Baseball Runs for
a Fan Base in Japan (Marketplace radio broadcast Sept. 14, 2007),
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/09/14/baseball_nation/.
58. Claire Smith, Dodgers Look East, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1995,
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/sports/year_in_sports/02.13.html.
59. For the Record, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 28, 2008, at 20.
60. Brad Lefton, Sadaharu Oh Still Feels and Thinks the Game, N.Y. TIMES, May 4,
2008, at B2.
61. For the Record, supra note 59.
62. Lefton, supra note 60.
63. For the Record, supra note 59.
64. Jack Curry, From Japan to Tampa, Iwamura Lives Up to the No. 1 on His Back,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2008, at SP3.; Whiting, supra note 57.

ROSNERFINAL_FOUR

2009]

1/22/2010 5:12:21 PM

PLAYER TRANSFERS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

93

keeps up, Japanese baseball is truly finished.”65
Yomiuri Giants club representative Hidetoshi Kiyotake added, “Seibu
might have made a nice profit in the short term, but in the long term,
they’re strangling themselves. This is a big loss for the baseball world.”66
With NPB players leaving for the challenge of playing in MLB, as
well as its increased salaries and better living and working conditions,67
NPB is likely to lose even more of its players to MLB in the future. The
high fee paid for Matsuzaka and his potential for long-term MLB success is
a portent for Japanese baseball. Moreover, the fact that the MVP of the
Japanese national team left with great fanfare for a successful MLB team
that paid him nearly what the top MLB free agent pitchers in the market
secured is likely to lead to more NPB players pursuing careers in MLB,
which will only further the uncertainty surrounding the future of NPB.68
This dynamic is heightened by the fact that there is no longer a stigma
attached to players leaving NPB; fans are okay with it, as they can still
watch their favorite Japanese players on television or the internet rather
than in person despite their exit to MLB.69 In fact, most Japanese fans are
proud of these transfers’ accomplishments and identify with them, rather
than feeling resentment.70 It is simply not practical to expect that MLB
teams will cease their pursuit of Japanese players, just as it was impractical
to think that Japanese automakers would not pursue the U.S. market.71 To
that end, MLB scouts have descended upon Japan in search of talent.72
Japanese baseball officials are hopeful that a role model effect might be
possible, with more of the best young Japanese athletes choosing to play
baseball because of the success of the Japanese players in MLB.73
While the NPB team receives a windfall profit when it successfully
posts one of its players, this short-term cash infusion may be offset by the
subsequent impact of the loss of the player on the team’s on-field
performance, attendance, public relations, and television ratings74—all of
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. Regarding the fact that players are leaving Japan for the challenge of MLB,
Matsuzaka said in an interview with the NHK Network, "It's only natural to want to test
yourself in the best league in the world against the best players. The scale of big league ball
is something else." Id. Matsuzaka more than doubled his salary when he signed with the
Red Sox. Id.
68. Id.
69. Robert Whiting, NPB Players in Need of Strong Union Like MLBPA, JAPAN TIMES,
Apr. 14, 2007, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/sb20070414c1.html.
70. Whiting, supra note 57.
71. Whiting, supra note 69.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Evidence suggests that this began with Nomo’s departure for Los Angeles, as
Japanese fans followed Nomo in MLB at the expense of watching NPB baseball, raising
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which could have a deleterious effect on the team’s revenues in the
medium- to long-term. It is reasonable to expect that an NPB team would
be negatively impacted in both winning percentage and attendance when a
player is lost through the posting system because the team is losing a highcaliber player who served as a gate attraction for fans. The economic
benefits that NPB clubs receive from transfer fees are not necessarily
conducive to helping their future on-field success. Japanese teams tend to
be more focused on the short-term than on the long-term because of their
corporate ownership. As a result, the posting fees received by the teams
are either filtered back to the parent corporation or are intended to provide
the team with a needed infusion of capital to reduce what is usually a
significant cash shortfall; typically, the posting fee is not intended to be
used to sign another player in the hope of replacing the lost production of
the defected player. Unlike in MLB, where a team may seek to replace a
star lost through free agency with another high-caliber player, the limited
movement of impact free agents in NPB makes it very difficult to replace a
lost player even if the team and its parent corporation are so inclined.
A closer look at the impact of losing a posted player on the on-field
performance of his former NPB team yields mixed results. It is difficult to
estimate the impact of the loss of these players on each team’s win-loss
record, as there are clearly a number of other factors that affected their
performance. Nonetheless, of the ten players who have been successfully
posted, the former team had a worse record in the season immediately after
the posting on six occasions and a better record on four occasions.75 The
impact of losing players through the posting system on the attendance of
their former NPB teams is also difficult to judge with accuracy because of
the lack of reporting standards prior to the 2005 season.76 Before 2005,
NPB teams simply estimated attendance, and these estimates were typically
much higher than the actual number of fans who appeared to be in the
stadium.77 It is also reasonable to expect that the team would suffer in its
concerns that other players would follow him and lead to decreased attendance and
television ratings in NPB. Rockerbie, supra note 3.
75. The six clubs that fared worse in the season following the posting were Hanshin
(.063 worse in 2007), Yakult (.073 worse in 2007), Seibu (.127 worse in the 2007 season
following the loss of Matsuzaka), Orix (.079 worse in 2006), Yakult (.023 worse in 2002),
and Hiroshima (.022 worse in 1999). The four teams that fared better in the season
following the posting were Seibu (.104 better in 2006), Chunichi (.058 better in 2004),
Hiroshima (.015 better in 2003), and Orix (.026 better in the 2001 season following the loss
of Ichiro). NPB Tracker, The Effects of NPB Players Leaving for MLB, part 4, Jan 3, 2009,
http://www.npbtracker.com/2009/01/the-effects-of-npb-players-leaving-for-mlb-part-4/.
76. Paul White, Unclear How Fans’ Interest Is Affected, USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 2007, at
2C.
77. Average attendance for Seibu was 16,223 in 2005, increased to 17,597 in 2006 and
decreased to 15,187 in 2007. Pacific League,
http://pacific.npb.or.jp/bluebook/blu_spect1.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2009). Hanshin’s

ROSNERFINAL_FOUR

2009]

1/22/2010 5:12:21 PM

PLAYER TRANSFERS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

95

public relations as a result of transferring a star performer. Much as
American sports fans protest the loss of a favorite player to another team
via free agency by voicing their anger at the team, a Japanese team that
posts a player risks incurring the wrath of its fan base. If, as a result, fans
stay away from the ballpark and do not watch television broadcasts, then
the team’s revenues will suffer. While fans tend to be forgiving over the
occasional loss of a player, a team that regularly posts players will not be as
fortunate.
Finally, the television ratings for NPB games have fallen significantly
as an increasing number of the league’s better players have moved to
MLB.78 Meanwhile, MLB games are broadcast daily in Japan and receive

average attendance was 43,218 in 2006 and 43,669 in 2007. Id. Average attendance for
Yakult Swallows was 18,019 in 2006 and increased to 18,517 in 2007. Central League,
http://www.npb.or.jp/cl/entertaiment/report/index3.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). Orix
Buffaloes attendance increased from 19,943 in 2005 to 20,445 in 2006. Id.
78. Tom Van Riper, Major League Baseball Goes Global, FORBES, Dec. 20, 2005,
http://www.forbes.com/2005/12/20/baseball-gm-disney-cx_tvr_1220baseball.html.
Television ratings for games for the Yomiuri Giants, historically the most popular team in
Japan, decreased from 21.4 percent in 1996 to 9.7 percent in 2008, according to Video
Research, a Tokyo-based TV ratings company.
http://www.videor.co.jp/data/ratedata/program/07giants.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
Unlike in the United States, the terrestrial broadcasting stations still have a significant share
of the market in Japan, and the only team that had its games consistently broadcasted on
terrestrial stations was the Yomiuri Giants. Letter from Kohei Nakagawa, Attorney, TMI
Associates, to Scott Rosner (Feb. 26, 2009) (on file with author). The games for other teams
are broadcast on satellite and cable television but, unfortunately, the ratings for these media
are not made public. Id. However, the ratings for the terrestrial games are made public. Id.
The sharp drop in ratings can be attributed in part to Yomiuri's ‘Yankees-like’ strategy of
bringing star players from other NPB teams through domestic free agency, which upset its
fan base. However, the loss of Giants and other star NPB players to MLB through both
posting and free agency in 2000 and 2001 likely had an even more significant impact on the
ratings. Kazu Sasaki was the best closer in Japan, and he pitched especially well against
Yomiuri, which became a must-see matchup. Id. Ichiro was undoubtedly the most talented
hitter and Shinjo was a star player for Hanshin Tigers. Id. After they left for MLB, many
baseball fans began to feel that perhaps Yomiuri's games were not worth watching any
more. Id. However, the biggest cause of the Giants’ decrease in television ratings was the
loss of Hideki Matsui; it was the first time that one of its star players decided to play in
MLB. Id. The drop in the ratings led the television stations to reduce the number of
Yomiuri games they broadcasted nationally. Id. In 2008, only half of the Giants games were
broadcast on the terrestrial broadcasting channels. Id. Demand fell along with the reduced
supply, with average ratings dropping below 10 percent. Id. When a rating for a prime time
(7:00 pm - 9:00 pm) program is below 10 percent in Japan, it is regarded as not a popular
program. Id. The ratings of the popular programs on the prime time are usually around 16 20%. Id. The low ratings resulted in lower prices being paid for Yomiuri’s broadcasting
rights. Id. Although the actual price is not made public, it is believed that the price is now
about half what it was in the past. Id. Other teams’ games are mainly broadcasted on local
stations or cable channels and the ratings were low from the start. Id. Therefore, although
the official data is not available, it seems to be that the loss of their star players is not
hurting their television ratings as much. Id. In fact, due to efforts to operate more wisely by

ROSNERFINAL_FOUR

96

1/22/2010 5:12:21 PM

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 12:1

detailed coverage in Japanese newspapers, with many Japanese fans
following MLB closely.79 More people in Japan watched Matsuzaka pitch
his Red Sox games in 2007—all of which were broadcast on NHK-BS
satellite, which is available in 13 million Japanese homes—than watched
his televised Seibu Lions games in 2006 (which had an estimated
viewership of 100,000 fans).80 MLB has successfully monetized this
increased interest, resulting in nearly seventy percent of MLB’s
international revenue coming from Japan.81 MLB currently receives close
to $100 million annually from the Japanese marketplace—slightly less than
$50 million from Dentsu (a Japanese advertising agency) and NHK in
television rights fees, and approximately $50 million additionally from
licensing, sponsorships, and advertising.82
While some believe that a continual draining of the talent pool in NPB
will ultimately lead to the demise of NPB,83 it is far more likely that, with
the appropriate reforms to its currently flawed operating structure, NPB
will endure. There remains strong fan interest in and passion for the
league, it has a long history, it still produces numerous high-quality
players, and it may be the only country in the world where baseball is still
the national sport.84 To retain their viability, however, NPB and its teams
need to alter their priorities and organization, as currently their structures
are suboptimal for both business and player development.
NPB teams are operated in a manner that is quite different from their
MLB counterparts. Rather than operating as stand-alone companies, as do
the vast majority of teams in MLB, Japanese baseball teams are part of
larger corporations that use the team to market and sell their products.85
For example, the Hokkaido Nippon Ham Fighters are owned by the Nippon
Ham meat processing company and exist primarily for the purpose of
selling its products.86 The underlying rationale for using the baseball teams

focusing their attention on their local markets, some teams (especially those in the Pacific
League) are thought to be getting higher local television ratings. Id. However, the price of
their broadcasting rights seems to have not gone up yet. Id. The price for the broadcasting
rights of these teams are still traded at much lower prices than those of Yomiuri's games. Id.
79. ROBERT K. FITTS & DANIEL K. INOUYE, WALLY YONAMINE: THE MAN WHO
CHANGED JAPANESE BASEBALL 316-17 (2008).
80. Whiting, supra note 57.
81. Baseball Runs for a Fan Base in Japan, supra note 57.
82. See Zimbalist, supra note 23.
83. Whiting, supra note 57.
84. Whiting, supra note 69.
85. Whiting, supra note 57.
86. Id. The other teams in NPB and its owners are the Yomiuri Giants (Yomiuri media
conglomerate); Hiroshima Toyo Carp (Toyo car components Company); Yokohama Bay
Stars (Tokyo Broadcasting System); Tokyo Yakult Swallows (Yakult Corporation, a yogurt
maker); Hanshin Tigers (Hanshin Electric Railway Company); Chunichi Dragons (Chunichi
media group); Fukuoka SoftBank Hawks (SoftBank internet services company); Saitama
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in this fashion is that Japanese companies believe it is cheaper to purchase
and run the team and get in the media every day through the coverage of
the games than it is to advertise on Japanese prime-time television.87 This
belief is reflected in the selection and deployment of their managerial
talent. Unlike their American counterparts, Japanese baseball club
executives typically are not baseball experts; instead, they are employees
who rotate through the team from the parent company’s headquarters.88
The league’s fragmented structure is reflected in its flat growth over the
past two decades, with attendance hovering around 20 million per year and
total league revenues at approximately $1 billion.89 Historically, two NPB
teams have done well on and off the field; the Yomiuri Giants and Hanshin
Tigers both draw 3 million fans annually and are estimated to generate ¥20
billion annually, primarily through gate receipts and television rights fees.90
The teams hand their profits over to their parent companies.91 Most other
teams suffer operating losses even when successful on the field.92 For
Seibu Lions (Seibu railway company); Chiba Lotte Marines (Lotte foods conglomerate);
Orix Buffaloes (Orix, a financial services company based in Tokyo); and Tohoku Rakuten
Golden Eagles (Rakuten online shopping mall). See Bay Stars Get New Owners, JAPAN
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2002, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/sb20020202a1.html (discussing
ownership of the Yokohama Bay Stars); Kate Berry, Houlihan Officers Sell Shares as Part
BUS.
J.,
Nov.
7,
2005,
of
Orix
Takeover,
L.A.
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Houlihan+officers+sell+shares+as+part+of+Orix+takeover.a0139170905 (discussing ownership of the Orix Buffaloes); Carp Owner Dies, JAPAN
TIMES, July 12, 2002, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/sb20020712a2.html (discussing
ownership of the Hiroshima Toyo Carp); Fukuoka SoftBank Hawks Get Green Light, JAPAN
TIMES, Dec. 25, 2004, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/sb20041225a2.html (discussing
SoftBank ownership of the Hawks); Mondo Times, Chunichi Shimbun,
http://www.mondotimes.com/1/world/jp/200/4631/11683 (last visited Oct. 14, 2009)
(discussing ownership of the Chunichi Dragons); Michiyo Nakamoto, Baseball Fans Upset
TIMES,
Nov.
7,
2005,
by
Shifts
in
Ownership,
L.A.
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/nov/07/business/ft-baseball7
(discussing
corporate
ownership of the Hanshin Tigers, Saitama Seibu Lions, Orix Buffaloes, Yomiuri Giants, and
the Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles); Eric Neel, Gaijin No Longer Means “Outsider,”
Feb.
28,
2007,
ESPN.COM,
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/asia/columns/story?columnist=neel_eric&id=2766707
(discussing ownership of the Tokyo Yakult Swallows); Jeff Passan, Happy Valentine,
SPORTS,
Mar.
21,
2008,
http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/news?slug=jpYAHOO
valentine032008&prov=yhoo&type=lgns (discussing ownership of the Chiba Lotte
Marines); Michael Westbay, 2009 Japanese Baseball Teams, PRO YAKYU NOW,
http://japanesebaseball.com/teams/index.gsp (last visited Oct. 14, 2009) (providing a list of
teams for the 2009 season).
87. Whiting, supra note 57.
88. Id. American sports fans would find it surprising to note that, in 2007, the Orix
Buffaloes newly appointed general manager told reporters that he only had heard of one
player on the entire team. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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example, when the Nippon Ham Fighters won the title in 2006, “[they]
drew 1,635,410 fans. . . . [and they] still needed a multimillion dollar
bailout from [their] parent company.”93 The Chiba Lotte Marines were
estimated to have lost over ¥2 billion in 2005 when they won the title, and
the Chunichi Dragons won the Central League pennant in both 2005 and
2006, but were estimated to have lost more than ¥10 billion during that
The decentralized league structure—where there is little
period.94
cooperation among the teams, no league-wide media, marketing or
licensing contracts, and no revenue sharing—results in stark contrasts
between revenues generated by individual teams.95 The revenue disparity
is evidenced by television rights deals: Yomiuri sold its 2006 television
rights fees for ¥100 million per game and Hanshin for ¥50 million, but
Chunichi did the same for only ¥10 million, Nippon Ham for ¥3.8 million,
Seibu Lions for ¥700,000, and Chiba Lotte for a mere ¥150,000.96 Critics
place the blame for this anachronistic business model on the Yomiuri
corporation’s unwillingness to cede control as the most powerful team in
NPB.97
Another area in which there is a significant difference between MLB
and NPB is in their playing facilities. Whereas most MLB teams either
own their own playing facilities or have very favorable lease agreements
that allow them to control most of the revenue generated by the facility,
NPB teams generally do not own their stadiums (though Seibu does, and
yet it still loses money) or control ancillary revenue streams, such as
concessions and sponsorships, and must pay hefty rents for their facilities.98
NPB teams are slowly beginning to become more focused on the
business side of the game. For example, following the lead of the SoftBank
Hawks, all of NPB’s Pacific League teams are now streaming their home
games live over the internet for free, the Chiba Lotte Marines are running
pre- and post-game promotions,99 and the league adopted interleague play
in 2005 and postseason playoffs leading up to the Japan Series in 2007.100
In addition, mimicking the longstanding practice of North American sports
leagues, which have allowed their media rights fees to grow exponentially
over time, all of the Pacific League teams sold their broadcasting rights to a
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Robert Whiting, NPB Needs Major Reform, Vision to Prosper Like MLB, JAPAN
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2007, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/sb20070413c1.html. The NPB
league office’s only revenue is derived from an ¥80 million assessment on each team, the
league All-Star Game, and the Japan Series. Id.
96. Whiting, supra note 57.
97. Whiting, supra note 95.
98. Whiting, supra note 57.
99. Whiting, supra note 95.
100. Id.
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subsidiary of SoftBank, which in turn negotiated with broadcasting stations
to give licenses. Though the price agreements reached in these deals are
not made public, the Pacific League should see a long-term increase in its
rights fees if the North American leagues are any indication. These efforts
are all an attempt to generate more revenues from the on-field product.
There are also significant differences in player development between
the Japanese and American professional leagues. Most MLB teams have
six minor league teams with a total of 125-150 players in their farm
systems at any one time. This arrangement cost the average MLB team
more than $20 million in 2007.101 American minor leaguers spend more
time playing games than they do practicing. In contrast, there is
comparatively little investment by NPB teams in the Japanese minor league
system. Each team only has seventy players in its minor league system,
and just one farm team that plays close to 100 games each season. 102
Japanese minor leaguers spend most of their time practicing rather than
playing games.103
While it could be a reflection of different philosophies of player
development, it is likely that NPB parent companies do not want to spend
the money on their minor league systems as their American counterparts
do.104 This has a huge impact on player development in Japan and has
resulted in a dearth of young stars available to replace players who leave
Japan for MLB.105
It appears that NPB needs a revamped structure where the clubs are
treated as profit-oriented businesses in and of themselves and league
operations are more centralized.106 In addition, although it is highly likely
that the top Japanese players will continue to leave for MLB, if Japan and
NPB can improve player development to produce more highly skilled
players107, and complement them with quality players from other Asian
countries, then NPB will be well-positioned to monetize its fan base and
remain a viable business.108 Such a business model is reminiscent of many
101. Andrew Zimbalist, There’s More Than Meets the Eye in Determining Players’
Salary Shares, SPORTS BUS. J., Mar. 10, 2008, at 44, available at
http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/58351.
102. Whiting, supra note 57.
103. Id.
104. Whiting, supra note 95.
105. Whiting, supra note 57.
106. Whiting, supra note 95.
107. Whiting, supra note 69.
108. Id. While this is certainly a possibility, there is a strong argument that importing
other Asian players is not a good answer. Even if the talent level of the players that left
NPB and of the players who came to NPB are about the same, it is likely that Japanese fans
will not support non-Japanese players to the same degree, such that fan interest in NPB will
decrease. This has already been proven in part by Yomiuri’s attempt to replace Hideki
Matsui with Seung-Yeop Lee, a Korean slugger. Though the two players are considered by
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successful domestic soccer leagues around the world; while the local
leagues cannot compete with the top European leagues in England, Spain,
Italy, Germany, and France, they remain financially viable nonetheless.109
Despite NPB’s aforementioned problems, it is unclear what incentive
individual NPB owners have to change the posting system.110 The system
works well for the many teams in need of a cash infusion.111 As a result,
many NPB owners will be reluctant to make substantial changes to the
posting system.
E.

The Possible Tazawa Effect

While the protocol agreement between MLB and NPB establishes the
posting process as the transfer process for NPB players with less than nine
years of service, allowing NPB players to leave for MLB without
compensation after nine years of NPB service, the two leagues have no
formal agreement regarding the status of Japanese amateur players who
have not yet been drafted by NPB teams.112 Junichi Tazawa, a 22 year-old
Japanese pitcher, became the first Japanese amateur player to publicly
announce his desire to forgo NPB in favor of MLB. He requested that he
not be drafted in the Japanese system after he led his Nippon Oil team to
the semifinals of the Japanese corporate league championship.113 Despite
many to be of relatively equal talent and ability, their popularity among Japanese fans
cannot be compared. See e.g., NPB Tracker, A Look at Yomiuri’s Import Roster, July 11,
2009, http://www.npbtracker.com/2009/07/a-look-at-yomiuris-import-roster/ (discussing
Lee’s baseball statistics); NPB Tracker, The Effects of NPB Players Leaving for MLB, Part
3, Dec. 14, 2008, http://www.npbtracker.com/2008/12/the-effects-of-npb-players-leavingfor-mlb-part-3/#content (describing the impact that Matsui’s departure had on the field and
in the team’s popularity). This is one of the reasons why television ratings for Yomiuri
games decreased. Robert Whiting, Baseball in Japan: Not All Cheers, TIME, Mar. 27, 2008
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1725911,00.html. Another reason why
Japanese fans are unlikely to embrace foreign players is that the league has adopted rules
throughout its history that substantially limit the number of foreign players on their teams’
game day rosters. Japanese Baseball Frequently Asked Questions, Foreign Player
Restrictions?, http://www.japanesebaseball.com/faq/gaijin.jsp (last visited Oct. 8, 2009).
Currently, Japanese teams only are allowed to have four players on their twenty-five man
roster. Id. Thus, Japanese fans have enjoyed games played by almost-exclusively Japanese
players for as long as they can remember.
109. Whiting, supra note 69.
110. Robert Whiting, Foreign Managers Change Face of Japanese Game, JAPAN TIMES,
Apr. 12, 2007, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/sb20070412c1.html.
111. See id. (showing how NPB teams are making millions of dollars on posting fees).
112. Alan Schwarz & Brad Lefton, Japanese Are Irked by U.S. Interest in Pitcher, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, at B12.
113. Japan Tries to Discourage Amateurs from Playing in MLB with Ban, ESPN.COM,
Oct. 8, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3632083; Kaz Tadano and Mac
Suzuki are the only Japanese players to have played in MLB without previous NPB
experience. Id.
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pre-draft speculation that he would be the first player selected,114 NPB
teams ultimately agreed to his request and he went undrafted.115 Tazawa
subsequently signed a three-year contract worth approximately $3 million
with the Boston Red Sox.116
Despite the lack of any formal agreement regarding amateur players,
Japanese baseball executives were understandably upset with this
development. The Tazawa affair has strained the relationship between
NPB and MLB.117 NPB officials view the signing of Japanese amateur
players by MLB teams as a violation of a well-established understanding.
As NPB stated in a news release, “This was more than just a gentlemen’s
agreement, but rather an implicit understanding that the major leagues
would do no such thing. That a handful of clubs from the majors is trying
to break this gentlemen’s agreement is truly regrettable.”118 In an attempt
to disincentivize other players from following in Tazawa’s footsteps, NPB
adopted a rule that bans amateur players who sign with foreign professional
teams from playing in NPB for three years upon their return to Japan if
they sign out of high school, or for two years if they sign out of college or
the corporate league.119 Rob Manfred, MLB’s executive vice president for
labor relations, responded, “I’m sure we will have ongoing conversation[s]
with them about how we might be able to address their concerns.”120
How Tazawa fares in the United States could influence the movement
of Japanese amateurs to MLB.121 If he is successful, there will undoubtedly
114. Tazawa to Pass on Japanese Draft, Deal With MLB Teams, ESPN.COM, Sept. 12,
2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3583362.
115. Schwarz & Lefton, supra note 112.
116. Report: Japanese Pitcher Tazawa Agrees to Three-year Deal With Red Sox,
ESPN.COM, Dec. 1, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3736390.
117. See Schwarz & Lefton, supra note 112 (stating that Japanese teams were upset with
MLB when MLB teams were trying to lure Tazawa to MLB). Though the issue was
discussed at the annual MLB general managers meeting in November of 2008, there has
been no action as of this writing. Jimmie Lee Solomon, MLB executive vice president of
baseball operations, stated, “We’re sitting down with the various commissioner’s offices
from the various countries and talking with them about our protocol agreements, but nothing
definitive.” Selig Warns GMs About Economic Turmoil as Meetings Begin, ESPN.COM,
Nov. 4, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3682935.
118. Schwarz & Lefton, supra note 112. Interestingly, several major league teams agree
that Tazawa should not have been signed. New York Yankees General Manager Brian
Cashman stated, “I’m old school—there has been an understanding. There’s been a reason
that Japanese amateurs haven’t been signed in the past, so we consider him hands off.” Id.
To this difference in opinion, Rob Manfred stated, “It’s not due to any lack of clarity – it’s
just due to the fact that clubs have different views of the world.” Id.
119. Id.; Japan Tries to Discourage Amateurs from Playing in MLB with Ban, supra note
113.
120. Schwarz & Lefton, supra note 112.
121. See Michael Street, A Brief History of Japanese-American Baseball Relations, Part
3: The Tazawa Effect, ASIAN-AM. SPORTS EXAMINER, Dec. 4, 2008,
http://www.examiner.com/x-739-AsianAmerican-Sports-Examiner~y2008m12d4-A-brief-
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be others who attempt to follow. If he is not, MLB teams will be (at least
temporarily) more resistant to the practice. At the same time, Japanese
players may not be nearly as enthusiastic about moving to MLB,
considering the ban they would face if they returned to Japan.122
Despite an array of opinions by MLB teams regarding the signing of
Japanese amateurs, the competitive nature of MLB requires a timely
solution of this issue. It is unlikely that teams will allow themselves to be
placed at a competitive disadvantage out of deference to an unwritten rule.
Los Angeles Dodgers general manager Ned Colletti stated, “[t]here’s a fine
line between falling behind the competition because you’re quote being
respectful, and competing like others will compete. We have to be wise in
our decision-making at the moment of truth.”123
The possibility of increased movement of amateur players from Japan
to the United States places NPB in a precarious position, as it would further
drain the Japanese system of talent.124 With top veteran players leaving by
means of the posting system and top young amateur talent leaving by
means of free agency, NPB’s supply of talent could become a barrel tapped
at both ends. Ultimately, this could have a meaningful impact on NPB in
two different ways. First, a significantly depleted talent pool could have an
effect on NPB revenues, as fans may migrate away from a league with a
decreased caliber of play. Second, there could be fewer talented players
available for posting because they would have already left Japan as
amateurs. NPB teams would thus face a long-term loss of posting
revenues.
The above prospects could provide NPB teams with the incentive
necessary to change the system. If Tazawa’s move has an impact on other
young players, MLB could have leverage to negotiate a more favorable
posting agreement with NPB. A proposed trade off could be an agreement
by MLB not to sign Japanese amateurs in exchange for a change in the
posting agreement to one of the alternatives suggested in Part V. Absent
that, it is likely to be difficult to convince NPB to consider an alternative to
the current player transfer system, despite the aforementioned arguments.

history-of-JapaneseAmerican-baseball-relations-Part-3-The-Tazawa-Effect (discussing how
Tazawa’s performance in MLB will impact how many future Japanese players decide to
play in America).
122. Id.
123. Schwarz & Lefton, supra note 112.
124. To this point, Yomiuri official Hidetoshi Kiyotake recently wrote in Japan’s
Weekly Baseball magazine of how South Korea’s major league system had been damaged
by the loss of thirty-eight players who signed directly with MLB teams since 1994. He
wrote that “[u]nless fans here stand up and proclaim, ‘protect Japanese baseball,’ we’re
liable to fall into the same trap as South Korean baseball.” Schwarz & Lefton, supra note
112.
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IV. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL PLAYER TRANSFER
Various player transfer systems exist to facilitate the global movement
of athletes across professional sports leagues. The following describes the
various systems for the transfer of professional athletes in basketball,
soccer, and hockey, all of which are possible alternatives to the current
MLB-NPB transfer system.
A.

Basketball

The ability for professional basketball players to move to a team in
another country is governed by regulations set out by the International
Basketball Federation (“FIBA”). These standards are permissive and focus
on facilitation of player transfer.
The governing regulations state that “[a]ny basketball player shall
have the right to play basketball in any country in the world, within the
limits established by . . . FIBA . . . .”125 The process by which this occurs is
relatively straightforward. A player seeking transfer to a team in a foreign
country must receive a “letter of clearance” from the national basketball
governing body in his home country.126 This letter details the player’s
playing history and includes an attestation by the player that he has fulfilled
“all contractual obligations stipulated in any and all contracts between
[him]self and any team . . . .” (emphasis added).127 Once a player receives
the letter of clearance, the only way that the letter can be rejected by the
national governing body is if that individual player has not fulfilled his
contractual obligations to his transferee team.128 In essence, the letter of
clearance is the final step towards a successful transfer of the player to a
team in another country.
As it pertains to the National Basketball Association (“NBA”), the
rights to international players may be acquired through the annual NBA
Draft, an option not available to MLB teams wishing to acquire players
from NPB or most of the rest of the world. NBA teams are free to draft
any player who meets the requirements of Article X of the NBA Collective
Bargaining Agreement (“NBA CBA”).129 Once the NBA team has drafted
125. Fed’n Int’l Basketball Ass’n, REGULATION H – RULES GOVERNING PLAYERS,
COACHES, SUPPORT OFFICIALS, AND PLAYERS’ AGENTS 66, 70 (2008) [hereinafter REG. H].
126. Id. at 71.
127. USA BASKETBALL APPLICATION FOR LETTER OF CLEARANCE INSTRUCTIONS,
available at http://www.usabasketball.com/loc-application.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
128. REG. H, supra note 125, at 71.
129. NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. X: Player Eligibility and NBA Draft,
http://www.nbpa.com/cba_articles/article-X.php (last visited Oct. 1, 2009) [hereinafter NBA
CBA]. Just like every domestic player drafted by the NBA, an international player must be
at least nineteen years old during the calendar year of the draft. However, the NBA CBA
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the rights to a player, the team has exclusive negotiation rights with that
player for a period of one year.130
In both of the acquisition situations—where a player requests a letter
of clearance to join a foreign team and where that player is drafted by an
NBA team (after acquiring the letter of clearance)—the individual player is
the party negotiating with his own team for his release from any current
contract. Perhaps the highest profile international transfer to date is that of
Yao Ming. The Chinese star was drafted as the number one pick in 2002
by the NBA’s Houston Rockets, at which time the Rockets began
discussions with Yao’s Chinese team for his contractual release
(discussions also included Chinese officials because of Yao’s required
playing service to the Chinese national team).131 Ultimately, the Rockets
paid Yao’s former team a $350,000 transfer fee for the ability to sign Yao
to an NBA contract.132 Unlike the MLB-NPB transfer agreement, where
the acquiring team is bidding for the rights to negotiate with the player
(which operates as the buy-out provision of the player’s contract), the
FIBA system allows for the two teams to directly negotiate with one
another, a more efficient process than the first-price bidding.133 The player
transferred to the NBA is then free to negotiate a playing contract within
the confines of the NBA CBA with the team possessing his rights.134
B. Hockey135

1. Background
The National Hockey League (“NHL”) workforce was predominantly
North American until the 1972—73 season when a group of Swedish
players became regular contributors to NHL teams.136 The initial influx of
exempts all “international players” from the requirement that “at least one (1) NBA Season
has elapsed since the player’s graduation from high school . . . .” Id. at sec. 1. Instead, the
international player must fulfill the 19-years old requirement, and “express his desire to be
selected in the Draft in a writing received by the NBA at least sixty (60) days prior to such
Draft.” Id.
130. Id. at sec. 5.
131. See Josh Tyrangiel, The NBA’s Center of Attention, TIME, Feb. 10, 2003, at 68,
(explaining Chinese officials’ involvement in Yao’s move to the NBA).
132. Id.
133. See discussion supra Part IV, Section A (discussing FIBA’s player transfer process
and associated regulations).
134. NBA CBA, supra note 129, at sec. 7.
135. At the time this paper was written, the NHL and the International Ice Hockey
Federation (“IIHF”) had agreed to open their existing player transfer agreement in an
attempt to renegotiate the terms.
136. INT’L ICE HOCKEY FED’N, IIHF STUDY ON EUROPEANS GOING TO NORTH AM. 5
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European players was limited to Swedes and Finns for approximately
fifteen years until the fall of the Iron Curtain, when Russian, Czech, and
eventually Slovak players began to migrate to the NHL.137 In the 2007–08
season, over thirty-three percent of players who appeared on an NHL roster
hailed from outside of North America.138
Because modern hockey has a global labor market, it is critical for
international hockey to have a transfer agreement in place to regulate and
control the flow of players across international leagues. The NHL, the
National Hockey League Players’ Association (“NHLPA”), and the
International Ice Hockey Federation (“IIHF”) and its member hockey
associations reached their first Player Transfer Agreement in 2001.139
Covering the 2001-04 seasons, this agreement regulated the transfer of
players from one national league to another, although this transfer
happened primarily when players moved from non-North American teams
to teams within the NHL.140 The agreement provided that an NHL team
would compensate its European counterpart whenever a European player
was signed.141 This arrangement led to NHL teams paying European teams
$28.8 million for the right to sign 185 players during the covered term.142
This deal was followed by a two-year agreement that began after the
conclusion of the 2004-05 NHL lockout.143 Notably, however, the Russian
Ice Hockey Federation opted not to participate in the second agreement due
to its dissatisfaction with the financial compensation owed by the NHL
team upon signing the player, limitations on the number of players that
could be signed, and the deadline for signing such players.144 This twoyear deal was followed by an agreement that again excluded the Russian
Federation and was scheduled to be in effect over the 2007-11 seasons.145
However, the European nations exercised a contractual right to re-open the
deal after the 2007-08 season.146 As of this writing, no new agreement has

(2006), available at http://www.iihf.com/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/IIHF_Study.pdf
[hereinafter IIHF STUDY].
137. Id.
138. NHL International, supra note 2.
139. IIHF, Zherdev Last Player to Sign Under Expiring IIHF-NHL-NHLPA Deal,
http://www.iihf.com/news/iihfpr4003.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
140. Jeffrey P. Gleason, Comment, From Russia with Love: The Legal Repercussions of
the Recruitment and Contracting of Foreign Players in the National Hockey League, 56
BUFF. L. REV. 599, 604 (2008).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 605.
144. Id.
145. Canadian Press, Six Countries Ratify IIHF Agreement, July 13, 2007,
http://www.tsn.ca/nhl/news_story/?ID=213424&hubname=nhl.
146. Int’l Ice Hockey Fed’n, IIHF-NHL Transfer Agreement Re-opened, Dec. 13, 2007,
http://www.iihf.com.
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been reached. While there have been no negotiations of late with the
Russian Federation,147 the other European nations are still in talks with the
NHL.148
2. Problems with the Previous Transfer Agreement
The initial IIHF Player Transfer Agreement, along with the NHLNHLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement (“NHL-NHLPA CBA”),
governed the global movement of players, with the specific intention of
compensating non-NHL teams when their star players left for the riches of
the NHL. Players who were not currently under contract with an IIHF
team were free to sign with any NHL team that they wished (or any other
team for that matter).149 If however, an NHL team drafted and signed a
player while that player was under contract with an IIHF team (or while an
IIHF team held the player’s rights) from a federation that had signed the
Player Transfer Agreement, the NHL paid that country’s governing body a
fee of about $200,000 in exchange for that player being free to leave his
contract and come to the NHL.150 This was in addition to the value of the
playing contract that the player ultimately signed with the NHL club.151
For many European nations, and for the Russian Federation in

147. Jeff Klein & Stu Hackel, Chiding N.H.L. for Not Committing to 2014 Games, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009, at SP8.
148. Int’l Ice Hockey Fed’n, Global Agreement Coming Closer, Oct. 1, 2008,
http://www.iihf.com/home-of-hockey/news/news-singleview/article/global-agreementcoming-closer.html?tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=1&cHash=e7ce908d1d [hereinafter Global
Agreement Coming Closer]. However, there is little optimism that a deal is forthcoming in
the near future. Peter Gudmundson, managing director of the Swedish Hockey League,
stated, “I don’t think there will be a new transfer agreement now. I don’t know if there will
be an agreement in the future. If there will be an agreement in the future, I think it will take
some years.” Allan Hougaard, IIHF Transfer Agreement Falls Apart After Czechs Opt Not
HOCKEY
NEWS,
May
1,
2008,
to
Extend
Deal,
THE
http://www.thehockeynews.com/articles/15728-IIHF-transfer-agreement-falls-apart-afterCzechs-opt-not-to-extend-deal.html.
149. See Int’l Ice Hockey Fed’n, Life Without a Transfer Deal, June 16, 2008,
http://www.iihf.com/home-of-hockey/news/news-singleview/browse/2/article/life-withouta-transfer-deal.html? (explaining how NHL teams may acquire “free-agent” players from
Europe) [hereinafter Life Without a Transfer Deal].
150. Id.
151. Unlike the NBA, which requires that international players be 19 years old before
being permitted in the draft, NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 129, the
NHL-NHLPA CBA only stipulates that “[a]ll Players age 18 or older are eligible for claim
in the Entry Draft . . . ” where “‘age 18’ means a [p]layer reaching his eighteenth birthday
between January 1 next preceding the Entry Draft and September 15 next following the
Entry Draft, both dates included . . . .” COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN
NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE AND NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION, ART.
8, SECS. 4, 10, July 22, 2005, available at http://www.nhl.com/cba/2005-CBA.pdf
[hereinafter NHL-NHLPA CBA].
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particular, the problem with the previous system was the perceived
inadequacy of the payment for players. The $200,000 fee was deemed
insufficient to compensate the former club for the loss of talented star
players such as Evgeni Malkin and Alexander Ovechkin.152 Russian Ice
Hockey Federation president Vladislav Tretiak stated, “‘Russian teams
would rather lose players to the NHL for nothing than sign a contract that
pays them what they consider a disrespectful amount of money . . . .’”153
Russia did not sign either the 2005-07 or 2007-11 IIHF-NHL Player
Transfer Agreements. As a result, the NHL, the Russian Federation, and
the players were not bound by the terms of the Player Transfer Agreement
when a Russian player was drafted by an NHL team.154 When star players
Malkin (second overall pick in the 2004 NHL Draft) and Ovechkin (first
overall pick in the 2004 NHL Draft) joined the NHL, their former teams
did not receive any compensation because no agreement existed.155 The
lack of Russian participation in the Player Transfer Agreement signaled a
problem that is the complete opposite of that faced by NPB and MLB.156 In
hockey, the transferee team receives too little compensation.
Though the controversy centers primarily around compensation, the
European federations have other issues surrounding player transfer
agreements. First, the fact that many players leave the European leagues
and languish in North American minor leagues without ever making it to
the NHL indicates that NHL clubs have been stockpiling young European
players in their minor league systems.157 In the 2007 – 08 season, there
were fifty-nine European players who signed with NHL teams: six played
in the NHL that season, seven were returned to their European teams, and
forty-six played in North American minor leagues.158 One underlying
reason for this stockpiling is a clause in the 2005 NHL-NHLPA CBA that

152. See Gennady Fyodorov, Russians Ready to Say “Nyet” to NHL Transfer Deal,
REUTERS, May 8, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/sportsNews/idUSL088285920070508 (explaining the RIHF
rejected a new transfer agreement with the NHL because it felt its teams were not being
properly compensated when players left for the NHL.
153. Gleason, supra note 140, at 606 (citing NHL.com, Russians Turn Down Transfer
Agreement, Club Teams Want More Respect, May 9, 2007,
http://www.nhl.com/nhl/app?articleid=305462&page=NewsPage&service=page).
154. See John Dellapina, Ranger Pick is Russian Over, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 24,
2007, at 63 (discussing how the New York Rangers worked to draft a top Russian player).
155. See Fyodorov, supra note 152 (discussing the Russian Ice Hockey Federation’s
response to Malkin and Ovechkin’s transfers).
156. See discussion supra Part III (discussing transfers between NPB and MLB).
157. See Int’l Ice Hockey Fed’n, Q & A with René Fasel, Dec. 17, 2007,
http://www.iihf.com/home-of-hockey/news/news-singleview/article/q-a-with-renefasel.html (noting that NHL teams sign many European players before they are ready to play
in the NHL) [hereinafter Q & A with René Fasel] .
158. Id.
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requires players to be signed by June 1 of the calendar year following the
year in which they were drafted.159 The European federations believe that
this system has a deleterious effect on player development as young players
leaving their home environments prematurely may never reach their
potential.160 In addition, the European teams lose the services of young
talented players who could become attractions in their home countries
instead of playing in North American minor leagues for a few seasons.161
The 2007-11 Player Transfer Agreement requires that a player under the
age of twenty, who is under contract with an IIHF team, be offered back to
his European team; the European federations would like to increase this age
requirement to twenty-two.162
The second concern for the European federations involves the transfer
deadline for players to sign with NHL teams.163 The European teams found
it difficult to replace players who went to the NHL for the upcoming season
due to the fifteenth of June deadline that existed under the previous
agreement; thus, they would prefer an earlier deadline that allows them
ample time to find a replacement.164
The third issue for the European federations is related to
compensation.165 Transfer fees under the previous agreements were paid in
American dollars, but the decline of the dollar against the Euro and other
European currencies means that the $200,000 fees were worth substantially
less in 2007 than they were in 2005.166 Given these concerns, the European
federations are in search of corrective measures.167

159. NHL-NHLPA CBA, supra note 151, at art. 8, sec. 6. This is a change from the
previous agreement where the NHL team had the right to the player so long as he played in
Europe. See CBA BETWEEN NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE AND NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE
PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION, ART. 8, SEC.6(c)(1997). Thus, under the previous NHL-NHLPA
CBA there was less incentive to sign young European players to contracts because the NHL
teams retained their rights for an extended period of time, allowing the NHL team to follow
a player’s development and sign him to a contract only if he was deemed a true prospect.
160. Q & A with René Fasel, supra note 157.
161. See Id. (discussing the problems relating to European players playing in North
American minor leagues in large numbers).
162. First round draft picks would be exempted from this requirement. See Int’l Ice
Hockey Fed’n, NHL/NHLPA Responsive to IIHF Concerns About Too Many Young
European Players Going to Minor Leagues, Jan. 17, 2008, http://www.iihf.com (discussing
how the NHL, NHLPA, and IIHF are trying to alleviate IIHF concerns about the number of
European players playing for NHL minor league teams).
163. Q & A with René Fasel, supra note 157.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. The dollar declined in value by approximately one-third from 2002 – 07, though
it has been resurgent recently. Peter Gumbel, Why Europe Should Stop Whining,
CNNMONEY.COM, Dec. 7, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/2007/11/15/magazines/fortune/gumbel_euro.fortune/index.htm.
167. Id.
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3. Implications of the Absence of a Player Transfer Agreement
Fifty-one Russians played in the NHL in the 2005-06 season while the
rights to forty-one Russian players were transferred to NHL teams under
the 2001 – 04 Player Transfer Agreement.168 In addition, thirteen Russian
players signed contracts with NHL teams under the 2005-07 Player
Transfer Agreement. However, the exclusion of the Russian Federation
from the 2005-07 agreement made these transfers ‘free’ as NHL teams paid
no compensation to their Russian counterparts for signing their players.
Under the agreement, NHL teams would have been required to pay $2.6
million in fees.169 The expiration of the most recent Player Transfer
Agreement means all European hockey teams now face the potential loss of
their players to NHL teams without compensation.170 If NHL teams were
to sign fifty-nine European players, as they did in the 2007-08 season,171
they would save $11.8 million.172
There is also the possibility of the unregulated landscape leading to a
lack of mutual respect of contracts. Such behavior may lead to teams
signing (or “stealing”) players who have valid and binding contracts with
other teams.173 This has already occurred with a handful of players who
signed with Russian teams despite having valid contracts with NHL teams.
Most notably, Alexander Radulov of the NHL’s Nashville Predators signed
a deal with Salavat Yulayev Ufa of the Russian Kontinental Hockey
League (”KHL”) despite the fact that his contract with Nashville had not
expired.174 An IIHF investigation found the existence of a valid contract
with Nashville but also determined that the IIHF did not have the power to
sanction Radulov from playing hockey in a domestic league due to its
bylaws and the absence of a valid player transfer agreement between the
NHL and the Russian Federation.175

168. Gleason, supra note 140, at 605 (citing IIHF STUDY, supra note 136 and Int’l Ice
Hockey Fed’n, IIHF-NHL Player Transfer Agreement Involving Six Euro Countries,
http://www.iihf.com/news/iihfpr8405.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2006)).
169. Gleason, supra note 140, at n.42 (citing NHL.com, Russians Turn Down Transfer
Agreement, Club Teams Want More Respect, May 9, 2007,
http://www.nhl.com/nhl/app?articleid=305462&page=NewsPage&service=page). This
figure is calculated by multiplying the number of players signed (thirteen) by the $200,000
fee due under the 2006-07 Player Transfer Agreement.
170. See Q & A with René Fasel, supra note 157 (exploring the benefits and risks of reopening negotiations for a Player Transfer Agreement).
171. Id.
172. Fifty-nine players at $200,000 per player.
173. See Global Agreement Coming Closer, supra note 148 (discussing the investigation
of Alexander Radulov who signed with a Russian team while under contract with an NHL
team).
174. Id.
175. Id.
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While the Russian Federation would prefer a system similar to that in
international soccer that would require the NHL teams to negotiate directly
with Russian teams over the terms of player transfers, the NHL has
understandably balked at such a request.176 The NHL-NHLPA CBA
prohibits NHL teams from negotiating directly with European clubs and
prevents circumvention of this clause through threats of severe penalties,
including significant fines and loss of draft picks.177 Any prolonged period
without a Player Transfer Agreement could impact the number of European
players selected in the NHL entry draft, with NHL teams reluctant to waste
valuable draft picks on players who they may be unable to sign. This
scenario has already manifested itself with Russian players: only fifteen
were selected in the 2006 NHL entry draft and nine in both the 2007 and
2008 versions, compared with forty-four in 2000.178
The NHL and its teams, the KHL and other European leagues, the
various European federations, and the players themselves will all feel the
long-term impact of a period without a player transfer agreement.
Although NHL teams are realizing the savings of a free transfer system in
the near term, the long-term costs could be troublesome. If the migration
of talented European players to the NHL slows dramatically—as has
already happened with Russians—the drop-off in talent may be reflected in
lower quality of play. This drop in talent, in turn, could have a negative
impact on league revenues, as fans might find NHL hockey less
entertaining. Nonetheless, if the most talented Europeans continue to
pursue their dreams of playing in the top hockey league in the world and
securing the larger contracts that come with it, then this drop in revenues is
unlikely to occur. Conversely, while the KHL and other European leagues
would certainly lose out on the compensation received when their top
players are lost, they could see an increase in their overall quality of play as
more players choose to stay at home. The increased quality of play would
make the sport more attractive to consumers and revenues would be
expected to increase. This is likely to be of some benefit to the KHL as it

176. See Life Without a Transfer Deal, supra note 149 (describing the Russian
Federation’s concerns with the Player Transfer Agreement); See also Eric McEriain,
Russian Hockey Plans a Resurgence, SPORTING NEWS, Feb. 6, 2008,
http://www.sportingnews.com/yourturn/viewtopic.php?t=347960 (explaining the Russian
Federation’s preference for a player transfer system similar to that used in international
soccer leagues).
177. Life Without a Transfer Deal, supra note 149.
178. Simon Richard, 2008 Prospects: Nikita Filatov, HOCKEY’S FUTURE, Jan. 4, 2008,
http://www.hockeysfuture.com/articles/10114/2008_prospects_nikita_filatov/; See also
Eugene Belashchenko, 2008 Russian Draft Review, HOCKEY’S FUTURE, July 11, 2008,
http://www.hockeysfuture.com/articles/10485/russian2008_draft_review/ (evaluating the
2008 NHL Russian draft picks).
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attempts to grow.179 Ultimately, the KHL could compete with the NHL to
become the top hockey league in the world, if it is successful in the longterm in developing young Russian players, keeping them at home, and
attracting talented European players. Not surprisingly, the dispute between
the NHL, KHL, and the Russian Federation over the Player Transfer
Agreement is most likely about each league’s desire to create an
increasingly global product and realize the attendant revenue increase.
Ice hockey is very popular in many European countries, but this
popularity is currently monetized by the domestic professional hockey
leagues in these nations rather than by the NHL or KHL. Though the NHL
has long attempted to tap the European market, it has increased these
efforts substantially in recent years. In addition to playing regular season
games in select cities, the NHL has established the Victoria Cup preseason
competition and participates in a marketing partnership with the European
Champions Hockey League.180 These efforts could be a prelude to the
NHL investing in the Champions Hockey League and eventually placing
franchises in Europe. Though still in its infancy, the KHL is similarly
eyeing a future European expansion.181
Despite all of this activity, if a player transfer agreement does not
come to fruition, the players themselves could be the biggest long-term
losers. Though salaries could increase due to the presence of multiple
bidders for their services, players may suffer. In the absence of a player
transfer agreement that establishes a smooth bidding process, it could be far
more difficult for them to be able to play for the team and in the league that
they desire. In addition, there is currently no agreement for the NHL to
allow its players to participate in the 2014 Olympics in Sochi, Russia, as
they have done since the Nagano Games in 1998. The Russian Federation
would obviously greatly prefer that the best players be available to
participate in what will be one of the showcase events of the Games.
However, given the tenuous relationship between the NHL, KHL, and the
179. A replacement for the Russian Super League, the KHL launched as a twenty-fourteam league in 2008-09 with the support of Gazprom and other state-controlled companies
that invested a reported $100 million at the behest of President Vladimir Putin. Putin views
the league as a matter of national pride. Teams play a 56-game schedule and have a $24.5
million salary cap, excluding foreign players (of whom there are ninety-seven throughout
the KHL). Each team is limited to five foreigners, who are frequently given free use of cars
and apartments and whose salaries are paid in U.S. dollars that are subject only to a thirteen
percent Russian tax. See Rick Westhead, Does Russia's Kontinental League Threaten
STAR,
Dec.
14,
2008,
NHL?,
TORONTO
http://www.thestar.com/Sports/Hockey/article/553524 (discussing the first year of the
KHL).
180. NHL Strikes Marketing Alliance with Champions League Hockey, NAT’L POST,
Nov. 25, 1998, http://www.nationalpost.com/sports/story.html?id=991139.
181. Russian League Takes Action to Boost Clubs, SPORTS BUS. J., Feb. 16, 2009,
http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/61559.

ROSNERFINAL_FOUR

112

1/22/2010 5:12:21 PM

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 12:1

Russian Federation, NHL player participation in the 2014 Olympic
tournament is anything but certain. It is clear that a ‘Cold War’ in
international hockey leads to multilateral losses in the long-term and must
be remedied.
C.

Union of European Football Associations (UEFA)

There are few similarities, as well as numerous differences, between
the European soccer transfer system and the baseball posting system.182
The transfer of European soccer players from one team to another closely
resembles a free market system and is more efficient than any of the
aforementioned systems. In the Union of European Football Associations
(“UEFA”), the transferor183 team is permitted to conduct a direct businessto-business negotiation with the transferee team.184 Although there are
restrictions governing which players may be transferred, the fact that more
than one transferor team can solicit the services of the individual player
allows for the possibility of an ascending price auction.185
In similar fashion to the MLB-NPB posting process, following the
conclusion of the playing season, individual teams produce a list of players
who are available for transfer to other clubs.186 These players are currently
under contract to the listing club, and, without being transferred, would be
forced to play out the duration of their contracts with their current club.187
Once the player is eligible to be transferred (i.e., his name has been listed
by his current club), and there is another team interested in acquiring the
player, then the two teams can begin negotiating the transfer price of the
player.188 The final transfer value is determined based on these direct
negotiations.189
An interesting component of the UEFA system also addresses the
apprehension felt by the Europeans under the former NHL-IIHF agreement:
compensation for the training of younger players. A specific formula is in
182. Rockerbie, supra note 3.
183. In this discussion, the transferor team is the team soliciting the transferee team’s
player.
184. Id. at 7.
185. Id.
186. Thomas M. Schiera, Balancing Act: Will the European Commission Allow
European Football to Reestablish the Competitive Balance that It Helped Destroy?, 32
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 709, 713 (2007).
187. Id. at 714. Before the decision in Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football
Assoc. ASBL v. Bosman, Case C-415/93, 1995 I-4921, was handed down by the European
Court of Justice, players whose contracts had expired were also subject to the restrictions of
the transfer system. Id. The Court invalidated the transfer system as it applied to players
whose contracts with the listing team had already expired. Id. at 716.
188. Id. at 713-14.
189. Rockerbie, supra note 3.

ROSNERFINAL_FOUR

2009]

1/22/2010 5:12:21 PM

PLAYER TRANSFERS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

113

place to determine extra compensation paid to a transferee team when a
player under the age of twenty-three is being transferred.190 This formulaic
compensation only applies to the transfer of players under this age
threshold, but the system is in place in order to compensate the typically
lower-revenue clubs for the development, and subsequent loss, of star
players transferring to typically higher-revenue teams.191 The loss of
promising young players, who tend to be less expensive than older players
of comparable skill, especially if they have not yet attained free agency,
can promote competitive imbalance where the transferee teams are
typically smaller, lower-revenue clubs. Thus, the extra payment for players
under age twenty-three seeks to remedy the perceived imbalance that could
result from these transfers of players.
In the absence of the additional payment for younger players, teams
are free to negotiate whatever transfer fee they can for their players. There
are currently two windows during the year that teams can transfer players:
one window during the summer and another during the middle of the
playing season.192 Historically, teams assigned a transfer value to each of
the players who had been listed for transfer.193 Unlike the baseball transfer
system, where the bidding teams must bid in secrecy in a sealed bid
auction, UEFA’s system allows for more full market participation, because
each of the interested teams will know the transfer price attached to the
player by the listing team. Football teams can negotiate with an unlimited
number of other teams over the transfer fee, and the result is typically a
winning bid that is minimally above the next highest bid.194 The
inefficiencies of the MLB system, where, for example, the Red Sox bid
almost $12 million more than the next highest bidder for Matsuzaka, would
never occur in the UEFA system; the winner would theoretically bid just $1
more than the next highest bidder.
Much like the NBA system, the transferee team and the individual
player are the beneficiaries of this type of transfer system. Though the
transferee team loses the services of a player who has marketable skills, it
nonetheless receives financial compensation for this loss. Given the
alternative—that the player leaves via free agency after the expiration of
his contract without any compensation being paid to his former team—
190. Schiera, supra note 186, at 717.
191. Id. Furthermore, should a player under the age of twenty-three be transferred
before his contract has been completed, an additional payment is to be made. The rules
require that five percent of the transfer fee paid to the listing team be distributed among the
teams for whom the player was a member between his twelfth and twenty-third birthdays.
Id. at 718.
192. Id. at 717.
193. James G. Irving, Red Card: The Battle over European Football’s Transfer System,
56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 667, 669 (2002).
194. Rockerbie, supra note 3.
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receipt of payment for the transfer of the player is a positive outcome, even
if it is not optimal. For the individual player, the transfer system is an
excellent lever to increase financial outcomes. In the absence of the
transfer mechanism (and free agency), a player whose rights were initially
acquired by a small market team would be subject to the budgetary
restraints of that team for his entire career. The transfer system almost
surely guarantees that a player will be moving to the team that most highly
values his services; often, this team will be larger and more highly
monetized, with deeper pockets to pay its players.
There is also an argument to be made that the transfer system is better
for the transferor team (the team paying the transfer fee) as well. If the
transferor team is a large revenue club that is not particularly adept at
developing its talent from within, and instead focuses its efforts on placing
the highest quality team on the field at any given moment, then the
transferor team may view the payment of the transfer fee as simply a cost
of acquiring talent. Although signing a player as a twelve-year old with
potential is less expensive than signing a twenty-three-year old superstar,
for a large revenue team without the skill to develop that twelve-year old,
payment of the transfer fee may be the best option for fielding the best
team.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRENT POSTING PROCESS

A.

Worldwide Draft

One alternative to the current posting process between NPB and MLB
is to have a worldwide draft, an option that MLB is likely to pursue in the
next collective bargaining negotiations with MLBPA, as the 2011
expiration of the current agreement approaches.195 In both the NBA and
NHL, an individual team is allowed to draft players from any country in the
world, so long as those players meet the criteria of that league’s collective
bargaining agreement (i.e., minimum age requirements in both leagues).196
For MLB teams, however, the pool of players from which the teams can
draft is confined to those players who are American citizens (or from
American territories), Canadian citizens, or anyone who has attended either
195. Ronald Blum, MLB Likely to Defer Worldwide Draft Until ’12, HOUSTON CHRON.,
July 15, 2008, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/sports/5889555.html.
196. See discussion supra Part IV. See also NHL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT,
SEC. 8.4(a) (2005), http://www.nhl.com/cba/2005-CBA.pdf (requiring that players eligible
for the draft be at least 18 years of age or older); NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT, ARTICLE X, SEC. 1,
http://www.nbpa.com/cba_articles/article-X.php (stipulating that the player must be at least
19 years old and have met certain educational criteria related to high school or college).
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high school or college in the United States.197 Because the MLB teams are
not allowed to draft foreign players, the resulting framework is a collection
of individual agreements with foreign federations regarding the way in
which foreign players are transferred to MLB teams. In most instances,
MLB teams are free to sign players from foreign countries in a way that
very closely approximates a free transfer system. These transfers, though,
are subject to the agreements that MLB has in place with the governing
federations, as is the case with both Japan and Korea.198
Because of the suboptimality of the current posting process for the
transfer of players from NPB to MLB, there is room for improvement in
this system. A worldwide draft would change the economics of global
talent acquisition, though it is unclear exactly how this would occur.199
Proponents of a worldwide draft believe that it would decrease prices paid
for high-quality international players and reduce signing bonuses by
providing MLB teams with leverage, since the clubs would have exclusive
negotiating rights with the player, rather than allowing the player to engage
the clubs in a competitive bidding situation.200 Those opposed to a
worldwide draft believe that it would increase player development costs by
eliminating the possibility of signing a large number of players to low cost
contracts and would disincentivize teams from scouting internationally,
since the players they develop would be subject to selection by another
team.201
The reality is that both parties are correct to some degree. Prices for
high-end talent would likely fall due to the exclusive nature of the drafting
rights, but the finite (and likely decreased) number of draft rounds would
197. MLB.com,
First
Year
Player
Draft:
Official
Rules,
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp (last visited Oct. 8, 2009) [hereinafter First Year
Player Draft].
198. See Gould, supra note 15, at 290 (discussing the negotiated protocol between the
U.S. and Japan). See also Barry M. Bloom, Tazawa Unlikely to Alter Asian Market,
MLB.COM, Nov. 8, 2008,
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20081105&content_id=3665291&vkey=hotstove
2008&fext=.jsp (explaining the Japanese and Korean federation player transfer agreements).
199. Bill King, Global Draft Building Army of Supporters, SPORTS BUS. J., Jan. 3, 2000,
http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/15318.
200. Id. The 2008 MLB international signing bonus period from July 2-August 31, 2008
resulted in five of the top ten all-time highest bonuses paid to international players,
including the three most lucrative deals ever bestowed—the richest being a $4.25 million
bonus given by the Oakland A’s to sixteen-year old Dominican pitcher Michael Inoa.
Baseball Am., Prospects: International Affairs: Top 20 2008 International Signing Period
Bonuses, Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.baseballamerica.com/online/prospects/internationalaffairs/2008/266917.html.
201. King, supra note 199. One MLB team’s scouting director stated, “Right now, you
can sign 10 players for $2,000 each and, with development, one or two might make it to the
big leagues[.] You make what by comparison are modest investments in scouting and
development and it pays off. I'm not sure I like a system that takes that away.” Id.
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still allow teams to mine baseball-rich countries for undrafted talent at a
reasonable price.202 A worldwide draft would also eliminate a great deal of
the malfeasance surrounding the signing bonuses paid to high-end
international players.203 In fact, the FBI has been investigating whether
scouts and team executives have skimmed money off the top of the bonuses
paid to Latin American prospects.204
A worldwide draft, or at least a United States and Japan draft, would
partially alleviate the suboptimality of the current system by allowing MLB
teams to assign a quasi-market value to Japanese players whose services
were desired by MLB teams. By drafting the rights to NPB players in a
draft that includes American players as well, MLB teams would be able to
assign a value to NPB players that approximated the players’ market value
by drafting more valuable players in earlier rounds and less desirable
players in later rounds.
The movement of players between NPB and MLB would increase as a
result of a worldwide draft because more players would move to MLB, or
the MLB minor leagues, than under the current system. By allowing more
players to move from one league to another, the artificial premium
currently paid for Japanese players under the posting process would be
reduced as more and more NPB players moved across the Pacific. MLB
teams, instead of having to pay upwards of $50 million just for the chance
to negotiate with a NPB player, would instead be able to draft that player,
which would constitute a more efficient and lower-cost method of
acquiring the rights.205
A draft where all thirty MLB teams participate against one another to
acquire the rights to the best talent allows clubs to understand the markets
202. For example, according to a high-ranking MLB executive who spoke with Professor
Rosner on the condition of anonymity, twenty-nine of the thirty teams currently operate
developmental baseball academies in the Dominican Republic. Players can be signed to
contracts at sixteen years of age, and each team has approximately thirty to thirty-five
players in its academy at any one time. The average player is in the academy for between
two and three years, and approximately 10% of the academy players make it to the MLB
club’s United States minor league system. Interview with Anonymous MLB Executive
(July 17, 2008) (notes on file with Professor Rosner). Chris Kraul, Finding Diamonds in the
Rough, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2008, at D3; Kat O’Brien, In Dominican Republic, Baseball is
a Way Out, NEWSDAY, Feb. 28, 2009, http://www.newsday.com/sports/in-dominicanrepublic-baseball-is-a-way-out-1.895448.
203. Alan Schwarz, Pressure Building for Draft of Players From Outside U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 2008, at Sports 4.
204. Id. Mike Arbuckle, then the Philadelphia Phillies’ assistant general manager,
stated, “The reality is, we’re finding that there have been dollars not going to players—guys
who used to get $30,000 but are now getting reported bonuses of $350,000 are actually
getting $75,000 and the rest is going to other places[.] The whole business down there, the
F.B.I. and baseball have decided to take a hard look at it. And part of the response is, we
eliminate a lot if we just put these guys into the draft. This is a way of cleaning it up.” Id.
205. Rockerbie, supra note 3.
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for individual players more fully, because the system of drafting players is
public and each team knows the relative values placed on players by the
drafting teams.206
There are, however, several significant hurdles to overcome before
such a system could be implemented, as both the MLBPA and the NPB
owners would have concerns that need to be addressed. In exchange for
206. However, the potential danger of expanding the draft to include Japan and Korea,
and continuing to exclude the rest of the world is a concern. In 1989, MLB expanded its
draft to include Puerto Rico. See Rafael Hermoso, Baseball and Books, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
13, 2003, at Sports 1 (discussing historical barriers to entry in major league baseball
experienced by many Puerto Ricans). Fifty-five Puerto Rican players were selected in the
MLB Rule IV (entry) draft in 1989. Id. At the time, there were thirty-two Puerto Rican
players in MLB and the island had a successful winter league. Baseball-Almanac, Major
League Baseball Players by Birthplace During the 1989 Season, http://www.baseballalmanac.com/players/birthplace.php?y=1989 (last visited Oct. 7, 2009). In 2008, twenty-six
Puerto Rican players were selected in the draft. MLB.com, Highlights, Details of Major
League Baseball's 2008 First-Year Player Draft announced, June 12, 2008,
http://tampabay.rays.mlb.com/content/printer_friendly/mlb/y2008/m06/d12/c2900909.jsp.
That same year, the number of Puerto Rican players in MLB dropped to twenty-nine and the
winter league had to suspend operations after playing for sixty-nine consecutive years. Jesse
Sanchez, Baseball Academy a Hit in Puerto Rico, MLB.COM, Nov. 29, 2008,
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20081126&content_id=3693851&vkey=news_ml
b&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb&partnerId=rss_mlb. Puerto Rican baseball officials attribute the
demise of baseball on the island in part to its inclusion in the MLB draft. Hermoso, supra
note 206. MLB clubs pay less attention to Puerto Rico and deploy fewer scouts to mine the
island for hidden talent, as any player found cannot be signed; rather, the MLB team must
draft the player. Schwarz, supra note 203. Since the MLB team has only a one in thirty
chance of doing so, the odds that the team will reap the rewards of its scouting expertise are
minimal. Id. Thus, the clubs focus their attention elsewhere—the other Caribbean nations
and Latin America—where they are able to sign any discovered talent and fully capitalize
on their scouting expertise. Id.
Since including players in a draft reduces the compensation that they receive, individuals
residing in a country that is included in a worldwide draft are disincentivized financially
from playing the sport. This could lead to decreased participation in the sport in that
country. A goal of any sports league should be to increase participation in the sport, so
including players in a draft could be counterproductive. Nonetheless, the relative impact of
including a country in a worldwide draft is decreased if the draft is truly global in nature;
that is, every country in the world would be subject to the draft, without exception. The
scouting impact would be eliminated, as MLB teams would deploy scouts to the countries
where they are most likely to find talented players. Other caveats regarding the
implementation of a worldwide draft involve the creation of a system that provides for the
verifiable documentation of player ages to ensure they are indeed their stated age and the
development of a training protocol for the two-year period of time between the ages of 16
(when international players can currently be signed) and 18 (when they would be eligible for
selection in a worldwide draft). This is especially important because there is no organized
high school baseball in many Latin American countries. Gabrielle Paese, Baseball School
Aims To Place More Puerto Rican Players In Major Leagues, P. R. HERALD, Dec. 13, 2002,
http://www.puertorico-herald.org/issues/2002/vol6n50/PRSportsBeat0650-en.html.
By way of contrast, baseball is played in Japanese high schools, similar to the United States.
Jim Allen's Japanese Baseball Page, http://www2.gol.com/users/jallen/jimball.html (last
visited Oct. 13, 2009).
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subjecting a larger number of future union members to a draft system
(where an MLB team acquires the rights to that player for at least six
years), the MLBPA would likely want the number of rounds of the draft to
be shortened significantly from its current maximum length of 50 rounds.
This would allow the MLBPA to get more prospective players inked to
contracts with teams that had demonstrated needs for that player, instead of
the player being forced to sign with the team who drafted his rights; or, in
the alternative, not sign with the drafting team and be eligible for the draft
in the following year.207
Even more significant are the concerns of the NPB team owners.
Under the current posting process system, they are the constituency for
whom the posting fee pays the greatest dividend; thus, the NPB owners are
the group least likely to desire change from the status quo. While the shortterm interests of NPB is arguably maximized when MLB teams pay posting
fees for the rights to NPB players, an argument can be made that having
NPB players eligible for the MLB Draft is in the long-term best interests of
NPB. That is, subjecting NPB players to a worldwide draft in which MLB
teams could draft the rights to Japanese players would almost surely
guarantee long-term survival for NPB—even if only as an unofficial minor
league for MLB. The focus of NPB, and many other professional leagues
whose players would be subject to the MLB Draft, could shift to player
development as a pseudo-minor league system. While NPB owners may be
reluctant to move to this type of model, it could be their best long-term
option.
Again, the leverage that MLB potentially has over NPB due to the
Tazawa signing could provide NPB with the incentive necessary to change
the system and accept a worldwide draft. If Tazawa’s move has
precedential impact on other young players and MLB teams, then MLB
could have the leverage to negotiate the inclusion of Japanese players into a
207. First Year Player Draft, supra note 197. There is evidence that the MLBPA and the
MLB owners have considered such a worldwide draft proposal before, but because there
was not enough time to consider the proposal fully, the sides decided to shelve the issue.
See MLB-MLBPA BASIC AGREEMENT, 2003-2006, ATTACHMENT 24 (WORLD-WIDE DRAFT)
202-03 (proposing a World-Wide Draft Subcommittee gather to take-up issues raised by the
negotiated expansion). In this attachment, the consideration was to expand the First-Year
Player Draft to “all players who are first entering Major League or Minor League baseball,
regardless of the player’s residence.” Id. The proposal and agreement to consider the issue
further mentions that the First Year Player Draft would be shortened to “at least 20” rounds
and “no more than 38,” a concession granted by management in order to draw more
international players into the relevant player pool. Id. However, the joint committee hardly
met in the face of MLB’s decreased interest in the idea and it was barely discussed in the
subsequent collective bargaining negotiations. Schwarz, supra note 203. For smallermarket clubs, who may not have the financial resources of their large market counterparts,
having a worldwide draft could realistically increase the club’s ability to compete for
international players.
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worldwide draft. The proposed trade off to this agreement could be an
agreement by MLB not to sign other non-drafted Japanese amateurs and
maintenance of the status quo vis-à-vis the posting agreement. Absent this
leverage, it is likely to be very difficult to convince NPB to accept
inclusion in a worldwide draft, despite the aforementioned arguments.
Undoubtedly, the long-term dilemma facing NPB is a difficult one:
try to forestall the internationalization of the game and risk losing even
more star players to MLB, or accept the globalization of the game as reality
and preserve a meaningful role. Though unlikely to occur, the greatest risk
for NPB is the possibility that it could lose its relevance following the
continued loss of major talent to MLB. Unlike the Negro Leagues (which
folded soon after integration led to most of the best black players moving to
MLB), extinction is not as grave a risk for NPB because of the geographic
boundaries separating the two leagues. After integration of American
baseball, often the Negro League and MLB teams were competing in the
same cities for the same fans, at a moment when the talent of MLB teams
was far superior.208 In the hypothetical situation of the best Japanese
players moving en masse to MLB, NPB is protected by the Pacific Ocean.
Although technological advancements allow Japanese fans to watch
Japanese players who are playing in MLB, this does not mean that those
same Japanese fans can see their favorite players in person. If for no other
reason than ensuring the continuation of the culturally important
performance of live professional baseball in Japan, NPB will still have a
niche.
B.

Flat Fee Paid by MLB to NPB

The presence of a strong Japanese professional baseball league is of
great benefit to MLB. Beyond serving as a pool of playing talent for MLB
clubs, NPB keeps the sport of baseball culturally relevant and popular in
Japan. That which is good for baseball is good for MLB, especially in the
ever-flattening global sports marketplace. The fact that the sport is
ingrained into Japanese culture clearly makes the selling of American
baseball in Japan a much easier task than it is in countries where the game
does not have a fervent fan base. Just as the minor leagues serve a
grassroots function for MLB within the United States, NPB allows fans to
develop a passion for the sport and experience it in a way that is otherwise
unavailable through the mere watching of televised games. It is easier to
sell MLB—the top professional baseball league in the world—to a country
that already has a strong interest in the sport. An NPB that is so weakened

208. Rodney Fort and Joel Maxcy, The Demise of African American Baseball Leagues:
A Rival League Explanation, 2 J. SPORTS ECON. 35, 44-45 (2001).
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by player defections to America that fan interest in NPB dissipates is selfdefeating for MLB, and the league must remain sensitive to this issue. To
this end, it would make sense for MLB to pay NPB an annual fee to allow
its players to be selected in the MLB Rule 4 draft. NPB could allocate this
money amongst its teams however it wanted, with the desired result being
that the teams reinvest the money back into player development budgets so
as to maintain a high quality of play in the league. The annual fee paid by
MLB could take several forms.209 It could be a fixed amount, or based on
the number and placement of the players selected in the MLB draft, or a
combination of both. It may be difficult to convince the Japanese teams of
the merits of this system because the corporate operating structure makes
the owners less likely to reinvest these funds into the teams themselves and
much more likely to extract the proceeds from the teams.210
C.

Per-Player Transfer Fee to be Negotiated by Individual Stakeholders

A third way to address the suboptimality of the NPB-MLB posting
process is to have the transferor and transferee teams negotiate directly
with one another for the appropriate transfer fee, in a similar fashion to the
current system in place in the NBA and UEFA. This system would ideally
be layered upon a worldwide draft, such that the transferor team in MLB
would have already drafted the rights to the individual player (giving the
MLB team exclusive negotiating rights vis-à-vis other MLB teams) and
would then engage in direct, face-to-face negotiations with the player’s
former team.
Unlike the posting process, where there is no direct negotiation
between NPB and MLB teams involved in the player transfer, this system
would allow the two teams to bargain over terms of the transfer fee. In
strict financial terms, the benefactors of this proposed system would be
MLB teams, because rather than overbidding for players as a result of the
first-price-sealed-bid auction, an MLB team would only have to spend the
precise value that an NPB team attached to the individual player in order to
acquire the player’s rights. In the example of Matsuzaka and the Red Sox,
instead of offering a transfer fee that was $12 million more than the next
highest bidder, the Red Sox would only have had to spend $1 more than the
value which the Seibu Lions had attached to Matsuzaka.211 There is no
definitive evidence to prove that $51.1 million, the price paid by the Red
209. The payment should be made directly from MLB’s Central Fund, so that each MLB
team contributes an equal amount.
210. See discussion supra p. 29 (explaining that NPB teams are owned by large
corporations usually more interested in maximizing short-term returns over long-term
value).
211. Bloom, supra note 33.
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Sox to negotiate with Matsuzaka, was the precise value assigned by Seibu
to Matsuzaka. In fact, many commentators, prior to the revelation that the
Red Sox had bid $51.1 million to win the rights, had said the transfer fee
would probably be between $20-30 million.212 There was little to no
indication by any of the same commentators that a bid in the $20-30
million range would have been unacceptable to the Seibu Lions; in fact,
because Matsuzaka would have become a free agent after the 2008 season,
the Lions wanted to ensure that they received some compensation for
Matsuzaka and probably would have accepted a bid substantially lower
than $51.1 million. Had the Red Sox been able to directly negotiate with
the Lions, after having drafted Matsuzaka’s rights, the dollar value of the
transfer fee would have more accurately represented the two sides’ view of
Matsuzaka’s value. Instead of the Lions capturing the entire inefficiency of
the posting process, the Red Sox could have reduced the inefficiencies
within the transfer fee by bargaining directly with Seibu.
A potential concern regarding the implementation of the individually
negotiated transfer fees is that the NPB team could dictate to which team
the player is transferred by refusing to negotiate with certain MLB teams or
declaring his price prospectively.213 For example, an NPB team seeking to
prevent its star pitcher from going anywhere but the Red Sox or Mets could
effectively put information into the marketplace that teams other than the
Red Sox or Mets should abstain from drafting the rights to the pitcher,
because the only two teams with which the NPB team would negotiate are
the Red Sox or Mets. From an economic standpoint, it is in the best
interest of individual NPB teams, and the Japanese leagues as a whole, to
have NPB players drafted exclusively by MLB teams with high payrolls.
NPB and its teams likely would receive higher transfer fees from largerevenue teams like the Red Sox, Mets, and Yankees than from smallrevenue clubs like the Tampa Bay Rays, Florida Marlins, Pittsburgh
Pirates, or Kansas City Royals.214 This unilateral power of NPB teams to
212. Sackman, supra note 36; McAdam, supra note 54.
213. This tactic has been seen in the MLB Amateur Draft, whereby individual players
sometimes disseminate information into the marketplace regarding their “signability”—
namely, the amount it will take to sign the player. This raises competitive balance concerns
because, traditionally, there has been a correlation between overall payroll and team
performance. If the lower payroll teams draft first (as a result of the reverse order of final
standing draft model used by MLB), and the best players are refusing to sign unless it is
with a team that can meet their contract demands, this could lead to a situation where the
best teams get the best new talent based solely on the fact that the best talent make contract
demands that only the best teams can afford. This perverse result could have a direct impact
on competitive balance within the league.
214. See Salaries Database, USA TODAY,
http://asp.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/salaries/totalpayroll.aspx?year=2007 (last visited
Sept. 15, 2009)(highlighting the multi-million dollar payroll gap between large- and smallrevenue MLB teams).
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dictate the teams to which their players are transferred could seriously
undermine the efficacy of the draft and individually negotiated transfer fees
to promote an efficient marketplace for the exchange of player services.
Should the individual NPB team be able to effectively control where
its players can be transferred, the NPB team may become unnecessarily
powerful and there will be greater implications on competitive balance in
the MLB. Smaller revenue MLB clubs, like the aforementioned Rays,
Marlins, Pirates, or Royals will not benefit from the talents of NPB players
in the same way that the larger revenue clubs could. The existence of the
worldwide draft would be far more equitable in the distribution of talent
across MLB teams, but this equity could be eviscerated if NPB teams (who
have a direct financial incentive) strong arm negotiations so that only the
large revenue teams have a realistic chance to sign NPB players.
D.

Per Player Transfer Fee; Uniform

A fourth alternative to the current posting system is to have a transfer
agreement that mandates a fixed, per-player transfer fee that is paid each
time a player under contract with the NPB team is signed by an MLB club.
A variation of this model was used by the NHL in its most recent Player
Transfer Agreement with the European hockey federations (minus
Russia)—for each player under contract that was signed by an NHL club,
the transferee team received $200,000.215
Whether or not this system contributed to the prevalence of
international players in the NHL is uncertain, but one thing the uniform
transfer fee certainly did was reduce the transaction costs of player
movement to the NHL. Because all three parties knew that $200,000 was
the amount the transferee team would receive each time one of their players
under contract signed a deal with an NHL club, there was no negotiating
that needed to take place. This uniform transfer fee was not the most
desirable option for the transferee team; however, it was preferable to the
current system where there is the possibility of the transferee team
receiving no compensation for the loss of its star players.216
The NHL team and transferred player both directly benefitted in
instances where the $200,000 fee represented less than market value for the
transfer of the player. This was typically in instances where the player
being transferred was an international star, or where the player
demonstrated the potential to be an NHL star. It was also these instances
215. Canadian Press, supra note 145.
216. This is currently the situation with Russian hockey teams, where the Russian Ice
Hockey Federation has thus far refused to sign the current deal. See discussion supra pp.
50-55 (discussing the state of player transfer agreements, including with the Russian
Federation).
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where the transfer is suboptimal for the transferee team. The NHL team,
however, captured the inefficiencies of this transaction because it did not
have to pay the “true” transfer value of the player and could instead acquire
the rights to the player for less than what they would have had to pay in an
open marketplace.217 If this system were applied to the NPB-MLB
relationship, MLB teams would prefer the uniform transfer fee arrangement
to both the current posting process and the individually negotiated transfer
fee systems, because the uniform transfer fee system, like that used in the
NHL, best allows the transferor team to protect its financial interests.
The individual players being transferred also prefer the uniform
transfer fee to both the posting process and the individually negotiated
transfer fee because it allows the player to capture more of his market value
once the player and the transferor team begin contract negotiations. The
value a team places on a player will be measured by the total amount of
money that the team is willing to spend on the acquisition of the player
(both transfer fee and eventual player contract), and if a team spends less
than market value on the transfer fee, it follows that the team then has more
money to spend on the eventual player contract. Matsuzaka was valued by
the Red Sox at $103.1 million, and if the Red Sox paid less than $51.1
million on the transfer fee, there would have been more than $52 million
left to negotiate an actual contract with the player.218 While Matsuzaka
probably would not have captured his full $103.1 million value under the
uniform player transfer fee, it is reasonable to surmise that the contract the
pitcher ultimately received would have represented more than the fifty
percent of the pitcher’s overall value that he received under the existing
system.
The clear loser under this framework is the transferee team. Teams
will not sign players whose value is less than the uniform transfer fee, and
will instead focus on players whose value is significantly greater than the
predetermined transfer fee amount. While there would undoubtedly be an
increase in the overall number of transfers from NPB teams to MLB teams,
the overall value of the transfer fees would not approximate the value under
the current system. Assuming that the NHL transfer fee of $200,000 per
player is adopted, it would take 250 player transfers for the Seibu Lions to
get the same amount as they did under the Matsuzaka transfer!
In order for a uniform player transfer fee to be effective, the system
must be implemented by all of the countries from which foreign players are
217. Logically, the NHL team more often than not captures these inefficiencies—at the
expense of the transferee team—because if an NHL team determines that a player’s transfer
value is less than the uniform $200K fee, the NHL team would not only abstain from paying
the fee, the team would also probably abstain from drafting the player in the first place.
218. See supra text accompanying note 41 (discussing Matsuzaka’s share of the $103.1
million the Red Sox paid in transfer and contract fees).
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drawn. This has been a major issue faced by the IIHF and encountered in
the implementation of the International Player Transfer Agreement.
Because the Russian Federation was not party to the Agreement, the
signing of players under contract with a Russian club by an NHL team did
not require the payment of a transfer fee.219 The major stumbling block
preventing the signing of the agreement by the Russians was that the
compensation for their star players like Alex Ovechkin and Evgeni Malkin
fell woefully short of the players’ actual value.
E.

Per Player Transfer Fee; Uniform with Classes of Players

A fifth alternative to the posting process is to utilize the uniform per
player transfer fee, but have several different levels of transfer fees based
upon the varying degrees of a player’s performance and skill set. Teams
transferring star players would receive significantly more in transfer fees
than would teams losing older, marginal players. Likewise, the transferor
teams would have to pay premiums for star players, which is precisely what
would happen in the open marketplace. Although this system is not
optimal for the players being transferred, it does represent a middle point
on the continuum between strictly uniform transfer fees and the current
posting process.
Formation of this system would require input from both the NPB and
MLB on the classification of a player, particularly if the amount of the
transfer fee were dependent upon a classification of the individual player’s
skill level. First, a classification scheme would have to be created, with
varying compensation figures attaching to the different types of players.
For example, a star right-handed pitcher like Matsuzaka would have a
higher transfer fee than an older utility infielder. Determining a player’s
classification, however, is where the creation of this system becomes most
difficult. Therefore, it would be necessary to have an independent thirdparty, selected using criteria agreed upon by both NPB and MLB, as the
final decision-maker on disagreements of player classification.220
Particularly with regards to determining the differences between star and
superstar players, these classifications could have significant financial
impacts.
This proposed system addresses the concerns an NPB team would
have regarding the uniform player transfer fee; namely, that the team is not
being compensated fairly for the loss of its best players. With regards to
the IIHF-NHL Transfer Agreement, lack of fair compensation for star
219. Canadian Press, supra note 145.
220. Such a system already exists in MLB, with Elias Sports Bureau ranking the players
into different categories (Types A and B) in order to determine the compensation owed to
the player’s former team should he sign with a new club via free agency.
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players was the precise reason given by the Russian Federation for not
being party to the agreement.221 While these levels of player transfer fees
will be both over-inclusive and under-inclusive, this system would yield a
more efficient transfer fee than would a uniform system. At the same time,
the individual player’s ability to capture his true market value would again
suffer as a result of the transferor team being forced to pay a sizeable
portion of the player’s value to someone other than the player himself.
F.

Percentage System

Another proposal for reform of the current NPB-MLB transfer system
is to have the transfer fee amount determined as a percentage of the
ultimate contract signed by the player with the MLB team. Under this
system, the NPB team would again only receive compensation if the player
signed a contract with the MLB team, and that compensation would be
subject to the market forces of direct contract negotiation. Unlike the
current system, where only one team may negotiate with the NPB player,
this system would allow for direct solicitation of the player’s services by
any and all teams that desired him. The percentage payment to the NPB
team would be in addition to, and not subtracted from, the final contract
amount received by the player. The cost of signing the player, then, is the
value of the contract plus the percentage-based transfer fee.
This proposed system is the most optimal for the player, and
represents a far superior outcome than is achieved in the current posting
process. Rather than have situations where MLB teams are calculating
player values using dollar amounts paid to the NPB team and not the
player, the player in this system would receive very near his market value.
This is especially true if more than one team is permitted to negotiate with
the player. But there is still the possibility that the ultimate contract
received does not represent the player’s true market value if teams
incorporate the percentage fee into the amount it is willing to pay the
player. Despite this possibility, this system does not impact the total
amount of the compensation received by the player nearly as much as the
current posting system, especially if the new system allows for multiple
suitors to pursue each player.
NPB owners may not prefer this proposed system to the one currently
in place, but there are structural factors built into the proposal that ensure
that NPB teams are fairly compensated for the caliber of players lost.
Because the payment to the NPB team is a function of the total value of the
contract given to the player by the MLB team, it follows that the NPB team
will receive more money when it loses a star player compared to a role

221. Fyodorov, supra note 152.
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player. While a percentage-based payment would probably not yield the
same possibilities of the current system’s payment, from the NPB’s
perspective, the percentage system ensures that the loss of the best players
yields the highest transfer payments.
Whether or not MLB teams would prefer a percentage-based payment
model depends entirely on the percentage payment established. Should the
percentage rise above twenty-five percent, it is conceivable that MLB
teams would prefer, or at least be impartial to, the current system. The
preferred aspect of this proposed system, from the perspective of MLB
teams, is that individual teams can negotiate with the player directly,
without the sealed bidding of the current auction. This transparency will
prevent the type of overbidding evidenced by the Red Sox’s $12 million
overpayment for Matsuzaka’s services. This system, however, still has
limitations. NPB teams could hijack the transfer of players, and skew
MLB’s competitive balance, by only negotiating with deep-pocketed
teams. This system may lead to competitive balance issues if small market
teams are entirely excluded from this labor pool. Further, the more
efficient transfers that would result from applying a percentage-based
system would favor Japanese players attempting to transfer and MLB
teams, defeating NPB’s intent to prevent an exodus of talent from NPB to
MLB.
VI. HISTORICAL PRECEDENT
This is not the first instance of a player transfer system being critical
to determining the relationship between MLB and another league. After
Jackie Robinson integrated MLB in 1947, the relationship between MLB
and the Negro Leagues was forever changed by the influx of AfricanAmerican players into MLB.222 Had a more comprehensive and effective
transfer system been in place, it is possible that the Negro Leagues would
not have vanished as a viable economic entity. There is undoubtedly an
irreversible trend of NPB players coming across the Pacific to the riches of
MLB. If the trend continues, the Japanese league risks becoming a league
bereft of its star players.
A formal relationship never existed, pre-integration, between MLB
and the Negro Leagues. This lack of protocol was one of the main reasons
the Negro Leagues diminished in popularity and ultimately folded in 1957,
ten years after Jackie Robinson’s historic feat.223 There was no posting
process and no system of payment for the transfer of players. Negotiations
were typically between the Negro League player and the MLB team. In
222. NEIL LANCTOT, NEGRO LEAGUE BASEBALL: THE RISE
INSTITUTION 386 (2004).
223. Id.

AND

RUIN

OF A

BLACK

ROSNERFINAL_FOUR

2009]

1/22/2010 5:12:21 PM

PLAYER TRANSFERS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

127

many cases, the Negro League club with whom the player was under
contract was omitted from the conversation entirely.224 This situation was
particularly true during the earliest player signings. As was typically the
case in the Negro Leagues at the time, Jackie Robinson was reportedly
operating under an oral agreement with his Negro League club, the Kansas
City Monarchs.225 The contract that he signed to play for the Brooklyn
Dodgers’ top minor league affiliate in Montreal in 1946 provided him with
a salary of $600 per month and a $3,500 signing bonus, but more
importantly it contained a clause stating that he was free of any obligation
to any other club with no compensation owed from the Dodgers.226 While
the white owners of the Kansas City Monarchs alleged that the club had a
written contract with Robinson and threatened both to protest to MLB
Commissioner Albert ‘Happy’ Chandler and to file a lawsuit against the
Dodgers, they backed down from these threats amidst public pressure from
the African-American community and media desiring integration, and
agreed to allow Robinson to play for the organization.227 Nonetheless, they
publicly stated that they felt that Dodgers owed them compensation.228
Though no litigation was ever commenced, these complaints were
subsequently echoed by other Negro League owners, who argued to
Commissioner Chandler that MLB teams should negotiate with Negro
League clubs directly rather than with the players, explaining “that while
they were ‘glad to see [their] players get the opportunity to play in white
baseball, [they were] simply protesting the way it was done.’”229 The
Negro Leagues’ commissioners requested the leagues be formally
recognized by MLB as either minor or major leagues, which would have
allowed them to participate in the compensation scheme that had been
established between MLB and its affiliated minor leagues.230 MLB
Commissioner Chandler met these complaints with derision.231 Though no
formal player transfer agreement or protocol was ever reached between the
leagues, subsequent signings of Negro League players by MLB teams were
negotiated between the respective clubs rather than between the player and
224. MARK RIBOWSKY, A COMPLETE HISTORY OF THE NEGRO LEAGUES, 1884 TO 1955
285 (1995).
225. Id. at 284. It was not until 1946 that the Negro League teams adopted the language
of MLB player contracts verbatim in an effort to stem the flow of their players to MLB. Id.
226. Id. at 276.
227. Id. at 284-85.
228. Id. at 283-85. The Dodgers also signed Negro League players such as Don
Newcombe, Roy Campanella, John Wright and Roy Partlow without compensating their
former clubs. Id. at 285, 289-90.
229. RIBOWSKY, supra note 224, at 285.
230. Id. at 285. See also James R. Devine, The Racial Re-integration of Major League
Baseball: A Business Rather Than a Moral Decision; Why Motive Matters, 11 SETON HALL
J. SPORTS L. 1, 54-62 (2001).
231. RIBOWSKY, supra note 224, at 285.
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the MLB team.232 Negro League owners hoped to realize significant
revenues by selling players to MLB, but this never came to fruition because
the Negro Leagues were unable to respond adequately to the MLB teams
raiding their teams’ rosters by doing so in kind, and they had no other
outlet with which to align themselves.233 Thus, MLB teams rarely paid a
fair market transfer fee, in large part because the Negro League clubs felt
that they lacked the leverage to negotiate.234 After the owner of his Negro
League team was rebuffed in an attempt to sell his rights to the New York
Yankees for $100,000, Larry Doby became the first African-American to
play in the American League in 1947.235 MLB’s Cleveland Indians
purchased his rights from his Negro League team for $10,000 plus an
additional $5,000 bonus, payable if he was able to complete thirty days on
Cleveland’s roster.236 The rights to Satchel Paige were sold by the Kansas
City Monarchs to the Cleveland Indians in 1948 for a mere $5,000.237
Nonetheless, these small transfer fees238 became a needed source of
revenue for the Negro League clubs, and the exodus of players to MLB
clubs accelerated in 1948.239 This caused a decrease in the quality of play
in the Negro Leagues240 and fans stopped coming to the ballparks and
supporting their favorite Negro League teams as a result.241 Negro Leagues
attendance dropped precipitously from 1946 (the last season preintegration) to 1948; for example, the Newark Eagles’ home attendance
declined seventy-one percent.242 By 1949, there were thirty-six former
Negro Leaguers in MLB and their former league was well into its
demise.243 When taken in combination with the desire of African-American
baseball fans to support an interracial business that more closely reflected
their goal of an integrated society, the poor organizational structure of the
Negro Leagues, and the typically poor team management, the Negro
Leagues finally had too many obstacles to overcome.244 The Negro

232. Id. at 299, 303, 307.
233. Fort & Maxcy, supra note 208, at 40.
234. Some of this lack of leverage came from the black media’s unfavorable treatment
afforded to Negro League team owners who attempted to receive compensation for their
players. RIBOWSKY, supra note 224, at 299.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 303.
238. LANCTOT, supra note 222, at 314.
239. RIBOWSKY, supra note 224, at 305.
240. By 1959, every MLB team had fielded at least one African-American player.
LANCTOT, supra note 222, at 391-92. By 1961, seventy-seven of the then 450 MLB players
were black. Id. at 391.
241. Id. at 306.
242. Id.
243. Fort & Maxcy, supra note 208.
244. LANCTOT, supra note 222, at 395-96.
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National League folded after the 1948 season, with two of its clubs
disbanding and a third focusing on barnstorming.245 While the Negro
American League reconstituted itself and continued to plod along, a lack of
interest, combined with other obstacles, undermined the viability of the
league as a whole. The Negro American League struggled until the last
Negro League game was played in 1957.246 Ultimately, while there is no
doubt that society as a whole benefited from the integration of the major
leagues, integration was not without its costs to the Negro League fans,
owners, and former players who did not make it to MLB.247
The current MLB-NPB system presents many of the same issues,
particularly with regards to player movement and the impact that
movement has on the health of the individual leagues. There is a
compelling argument that it is in the best interests of MLB to preserve the
long-term health of NPB, unlike what happened with the Negro Leagues,
because NPB (and not MLB) is the best cultivator of Japanese talent. The
owners of NPB teams have an interest in preserving the health of their
league, while MLB owners have a similar interest in their own league. Any
player transfer agreement would seemingly have to address both of these
competing desires, although the place on the spectrum between where the
self-preservation ends and the actual agreement falls will be the product of
negotiation.
As previously noted, one critical difference between the
circumstances surrounding the disappearance of the Negro Leagues and the
current state of NPB is the geographic proximity of the competitor league.
During the late 1940s, after MLB had been integrated, many Negro League
teams competed in the same cities as their MLB counterparts. In an era
when gate receipts were the primary source of team revenue, the fact that
many fans went to the higher quality MLB games had a direct effect on the
lack of monetization for the Negro Leagues.
In the current situation, however, it cannot be said that fans are
choosing to attend MLB games instead of NPB games. A more accurate
characterization may be that NPB fans are now following former NPB
players who have signed with MLB teams (at the expense of following an
NPB team) through digital media. But to what extent the following of
MLB via digital media will erode a revenue stream (gate receipts) for NPB
is uncertain. Another difference in the current situation is cultural.
Baseball has long been a very important part of the fabric of Japanese
culture and it remains the national pastime. There is simply too much pride
in Japanese baseball to allow the long-standing, deep-pocketed professional
245. RIBOWSKY, supra note 224, at 306-07.
246. Id. at 314.
247. See Fort & Maxcy, supra note 208, at 45, 47-48 (discussing the gains and losses
that came with the demise of the Negro Leagues).
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league to fail. Despite the conceptual similarities, there are substantial
differences between the Negro Leagues and NPB that are likely to lead to a
different end result and allow NPB to survive notwithstanding the
suboptimality of the player transfer agreement.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the ever-flattening world, the challenge for MLB and NPB is to
create a transfer system that is more efficient than the current model, while
at the same time preserving NPB’s status as a viable economic entity. It is
imperative for the sport of baseball that NPB remain intact; the demise of
the second-strongest professional baseball league in the world would have
a deleterious effect on the global growth of the sport and, ultimately, on
MLB. The triumvirate of key stakeholders must all agree to effectuate any
of the proposed alternatives, and there is an implicit tension between the
desires of NPB, MLB, and MLBPA. Two alternatives stand out from the
others. The first is a global draft layered upon a NBA/UEFA-esque system
of team-to-team negotiation. The second is a percentage-based system,
where the transfer fee paid to the NPB team is determined as a percentage
of the ultimate contract signed by the player with the MLB team. It is left
to the stakeholders to determine the system that best fits their needs.

